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DESIGNING SUPREME COURT TERM
LIMITS
ADAM CHILTON,* DANIEL EPPS,† KYLE ROZEMA‡ & MAYA SEN††*
ABSTRACT
Since the Founding, Supreme Court Justices have enjoyed life tenure.
This helps insulate the Justices from political pressures, but it also results in
unpredictable deaths and strategic retirements determining the timing of
Court vacancies. In order to regularize the appointments process, a number
of academics and policymakers have put forward detailed term-limits
proposals. However, many of these proposals have been silent on several key
design decisions, and there has been almost no empirical work assessing the
impact that term limits would have on the composition of the Supreme Court.
This Article provides a framework for designing a complete term-limits
proposal and develops an empirical strategy to assess the effects of
instituting term limits. The framework we introduce outlines the key design
features that any term-limits proposal must make, including frequently
overlooked decisions like what the default would be if there is Senate
inaction on a president’s nominee. The empirical strategy we develop uses
simulations to assess how term-limits proposals would have shaped the
Court if they had been in place over the last eighty years of American history.
These simulations enable comparative assessments of term-limits proposals
relative to each other and to the historical status quo of life tenure.
Using these simulations, we are able to isolate the design features of
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existing proposals that produce significant differences in the composition of
the Supreme Court. For instance, proposals that commence appointing termlimited Justices immediately could complete the transition in just sixteen
years, but proposals that wait until after the sitting Justices leave the Court
to appoint term-limited Justices would take an average of fifty-two years to
complete the transition. Our results also reveal that term limits are likely to
produce dramatic changes in the ideological composition of the Court. Most
significantly, the Supreme Court had extreme ideological imbalance for sixty
percent of the time since President Franklin Roosevelt’s effort to pack the
Court, but any of the major term-limits proposals would have reduced the
amount of time with extreme imbalance by almost half.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the Founding, Supreme Court Justices have enjoyed life tenure.1
Although a system of life tenure helps insulate the Justices from political
pressures, it also comes with costs. It can lead to Justices serving into very
old age, sometimes when they are no longer able to serve effectively.2 And
as Justices live longer and remain on the Court, it makes appointments
infrequent. This reduces the democratic check on the Court provided by the
appointments process,3 and it raises the political stakes for appointments that
do occur. Perhaps most importantly, life tenure and the fact that Congress
has not changed the Court’s size in more than a century4 means that
unpredictable deaths and strategic retirements determine the timing of Court
vacancies. This results in an unequal influence that presidential elections
have on the composition of the Court, which in turn has created disparities
in the influence of political parties on the Court. As an example of
differences in the influence of presidential elections, no Justices were
1. See infra Section I.A.
2. See generally David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical
Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000).
3. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 771 (2006).
4. The size of the Court is not fixed in the Constitution, making it possible for Congress to expand
or contract it, though it has remained at nine Justices for more than 150 years. See U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1; Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial
Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 269–74 (2017) (discussing the Constitution’s silence on the
size of the Court and early historical practice); Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?,
61 B.C. L. REV. 2747, 2781–88 (2020) (analyzing historical examples of Court expansion).
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appointed during President Jimmy Carter’s single term, but three Justices
were appointed during President Donald Trump’s single term.5 In terms of
the disparities across political parties, Republican presidents held the White
House for thirty-two out of the fifty-two years from 1969 to 2021, over which
time they made fifteen out of nineteen appointments to the Supreme Court.6
Due to the costs associated with life tenure, at least a half dozen distinct
proposals have been put forward to institute term limits for Supreme Court
Justices. These proposals differ in important ways, such as how the transition
to the new system would work, but the most prominent proposals all would
have Justices serve for eighteen years with their tenures staggered so that
two appointments would be made each presidential term.7 In addition to
equalizing the influence presidents have on the Court, proponents argue that
term limits and regularized appointments would have additional advantages
such as discouraging presidents from choosing particularly young nominees
and making the appointments process less contentious. Many have found the
case for term limits persuasive: commentators,8 politicians across the
political spectrum,9 and even the American public10 have all expressed
support for term limits.
Despite this growing support for adopting term limits, there are at least
three shortcomings with prior advocacy for their adoption. First, the
proposals reformers have put forward have often been silent on many key
design decisions. For instance, many proposals have not specified what
would occur if the Senate simply refused to hold hearings on a president’s
5. Supreme Court Nominations (1789–Present), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm [https://perma.cc/EL4S-QW9Q].
6. Id.
7. Various versions of this proposal have appeared in, among other places, Calabresi & Lindgren,
supra note 3; James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to
Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1093 (2004); Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to
Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799
(1986); Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, The Supreme Court Renewal Act: A Return to Basic
Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 467 (Roger C.
Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME
COURT (2014).
8. See, e.g., Maggie Jo Buchanan, The Need for Supreme Court Term Limits, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Aug. 3, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020/08/
03/488518/need-supreme-court-term-limits [https://perma.cc/B8L5-AYU3]; John Fund, It’s Time for
Term Limits on the Supreme Court, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 24, 2019, 6:33 PM), https://www.national
review.com/2019/11/supreme-court-term-limits-have-bipartisan-support [https://perma.cc/4L8T-B5Z8].
9. See, e.g., David Jackson, Perry Likes the Idea of Supreme Court Term Limits, USA TODAY
(Aug. 7, 2015, 12:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2015/08/07/perrylikes-idea-of-supreme-court-term-limits/81580084
[https://perma.cc/LDL9-HK45]
(Republican
presidential candidate Rick Perry endorsing term limits); infra Section II.B.6 (term-limits bill sponsored
by Democratic member of Congress).
10. See infra note 47 (citing surveys).
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nominee to the Court, perhaps because that outcome seemed unthinkable
prior to the Senate’s failure to act on President Barack Obama’s nomination
of Merrick Garland. Second, there has been little effort to comparatively
assess how the design decisions made by different proposals would affect
the composition of the Supreme Court. Third, there has been almost no effort
to document whether the empirical claims made by advocates of term limits
would actually be realized. Instead, as Professor Stephen Burbank put it, “the
work of many engaged in the debate [over term limits] is quite relentlessly
normative and replete with unsupported causal assertions.”11
This Article provides a framework outlining the features of a complete
term-limits proposal and develops an empirical strategy to assess the effects
of instituting term limits.12 The design framework we introduce specifically
outlines the key design features that any term-limits proposal must make.
These include decisions made in all past term-limits proposals like how long
each term should be, when appointments will be made, and whether “legacy”
Justices already serving at the time of a reform’s enactment would be subject
to the term limit. But we show that a complete term-limits proposal would
also need to address the rules governing a hold-out scenario of Senate
inaction on a president’s nominee and how to designate a Chief Justice. By
outlining all the features that must be included in a complete reform plan, we
provide a blueprint for the design of any future term-limits proposal.
The empirical strategy we develop uses simulations to assess how termlimits proposals would have shaped the Court if they had been in place over
the last eighty years of American history.13 The simulations use data on the
11. Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court
Justices, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1513 (2006).
12. Our research is most related to two recent articles. First, Christopher Sundby and Suzanna
Sherry estimate what the support would be for upholding Roe v. Wade if eighteen-year term limits had
been in place since 1973. See generally Christopher Sundby & Suzanna Sherry, Term Limits and Turmoil:
Roe v. Wade’s Whiplash, 98 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2019). After conducting a series of simulations, they
conclude that the impact of term limits on upholding Roe largely depends on whether the Justices
appointed under this system would care more about ideological alignment with their appointing president
than commitment to the existing president. Id. at 156–60. Second, Michael Bailey and Albert Yoon use a
theoretical model to assess the effect of politically motivated retirements on the responsiveness of the
Supreme Court. See generally Michael A. Bailey & Albert Yoon, ‘While There’s a Breath in My Body’:
The Systemic Effects of Politically Motivated Retirement from the Supreme Court, 23 J. THEORETICAL
POLS. 293 (2011). In a series of simulations, they find that strategic retirements have limited influence on
the responsiveness of the Supreme Court largely because they are symmetrical: for every liberal Justice
that retires early for political reasons, on average there is a conservative Justice that does so as well. They
also use simulations to compare the way strategic retirements occur under the status quo of life tenure to
what would occur with eighteen-year term limits, and they find that term limits would increase the
responsiveness of the Court to electoral outcomes, decrease the age of the Justices on the Court, and
increase the turnover of Justices. Id.
13. Our simulations specifically assess would have happened if these proposals had been in place
between 1937 and 2020. For an explanation of why we begin our simulations in 1937, see infra Section
I.B.
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lifespans of federal judges and the historical occupants of the White House,
the Supreme Court, and the Senate. We simulate how existing proposals
would have shaped the Court’s membership while varying when the plan
was adopted and when unexpected vacancies occur. These simulations
enable us to make comparative assessments of the drawbacks and upsides of
term-limits proposals relative to each other and to the historical status quo of
life tenure.
We use this empirical strategy to assess how five prominent term-limits
proposals would have shaped the composition of the Supreme Court.
Although all these plans would help to regularize the appointments of
Justices to the Supreme Court, our simulations reveal that there are two
important design features that result in significantly different outcomes. The
first of these design features is how the proposals would handle the transition
to term limits. Proposals that commence appointing term-limited Justices
immediately could complete the transition to each of nine active Justices
serving an eighteen-year term in an average of just sixteen years. In contrast,
proposals that delay appointing term-limited Justices until after the sitting
Justices leave the Court take an average of fifty-two years (and as long as
sixty-nine years) for the transition to be complete. The plans that delay
transition continue to allow for unequal influence on the Court across
presidential terms during the transition period, which is one of the key issues
term limits are intended to address. These results highlight why the details
of the transition process should not be viewed as minor; instead, they will
shape the composition of the Court for a generation and therefore should be
at the forefront of discussions of any proposal.
The second design feature that produces considerable differences across
proposals is how the plans respond to unexpected vacancies. Some proposals
would fill unexpected vacancies with senior Justices until the regularly
scheduled appointment of a new Justice. In contrast, other proposals would
require the appointment of a new Justice to fill the remainder of the
unexpectedly vacant term. We find evidence that a nontrivial share of
temporary appointments would require confirmations that may be politically
difficult. In some of the proposals, for instance, eleven percent of such
appointments would occur in exactly the conditions that resulted in Merrick
Garland’s ignored nomination to the Supreme Court (when it is both the last
year of a presidential term and the Senate is controlled by the opposite party).
Beyond the effects of these two important design features, our results
show that any of the major term-limits proposals are likely to produce
similar, dramatic changes in the ideological composition of the Supreme
Court. Most significantly, the Supreme Court had extreme ideological
imbalance—which we define as seventy-five percent or more of the Justices
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appointed by presidents of the same party—for sixty percent of the time since
President Franklin Roosevelt’s effort to pack the Court. Although there are
notable differences between each of the major term-limits proposals, they all
would have reduced extreme imbalance over the same time period by almost
half. This finding is explained by the fact that term limits prevent Justices
from using strategic retirement to maintain their party’s ideological
advantages on the Court.
Although term limits would ensure that the Court is more ideologically
balanced, having a Supreme Court that is more likely to be ideologically
balanced does have associated costs. Notably, term limits meaningfully
increase the number of appointments where the confirmation of the new
member would determine the ideological balance of the Court. In fact, our
simulations suggest that roughly sixty percent of new Justices would be
appointed to the Court when there had been a 5-4 partisan split on the Court.
Given how divisive the confirmation process was to replace Justice Scalia
(which was the most recent confirmation with the potential to flip the
ideological balance of the Court), this result underlines the need to design
plans that include procedures that directly address what would occur when
the Senate refuses to vote on nominees from a president of the opposite party.
And, as a corollary, this means that the correspondingly high share of
Justices could be pivotal voters during the final two-year period of their term.
This illustrates the importance of seriously considering the “final period”
problem, which is the incentive for Justices whose terms are about to expire
to engage in untoward or otherwise strategic signaling behavior. Taken
together, these results highlight the need for reform proposals to seriously
consider how creating a more evenly balanced Court could affect the
behavior of politicians and Justices.
Before continuing, we stress two caveats about our project. First, there
are a number of ways to reform the Supreme Court other than term limits
that have recently been proposed (such as increasing the number of Justices14
or limiting the power of the Court15), but we do not attempt to offer evidence
relevant to the choice between term limits and these alternative reforms.
Second, implementing Supreme Court term limits would be a profound
change to an institution that has evolved slowly over time. It could thus
change the American political and legal landscape in ways that go beyond
the direct changes to the composition of the Court that we explore in this
14. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the
Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 246–53 (2020) (arguing that Democrats should add seats to the Court to
retaliate for norm-breaking behavior by Republicans and to entrench democracy).
15. See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109 CALIF.
L. REV. 1703, 1725–28 (2021) (discussing various “disempowering” reforms to the Supreme Court).
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project.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides necessary background.
It explains the history of life tenure for Supreme Court Justices, discusses
why a number of commentators and advocacy organizations from across the
political spectrum have urged the adoption of term limits, and reports
descriptive statistics on the tenure of Supreme Court Justices over time.
Part II introduces our framework for how to design term-limits
proposals. It first documents nine design decisions that any reform proposal
must make. It next summarizes several different term-limits proposals and
discusses how they address a number of these design decisions. It then
outlines six dimensions along which these design decisions could impact the
composition of the Supreme Court.
Part III sets out the empirical strategy we developed for assessing termlimits proposals. It first describes the value of simulations, the way we
structure them, and the assumptions we make to conduct them. After
explaining our methods, we present results documenting how the different
proposals fare along the six key tradeoffs we identify in Part II.
Part IV then offers implications from our analyses for designers of
Supreme Court term-limits policies. Our primary findings concern four key
design decisions of a potential reform: how it handles the transition period,
how it addresses unexpected vacancies, whether it includes provisions
dealing with a Senate’s refusal to act on a president’s nominees, and whether
it addresses any problems caused by Justices’ potential incentives to change
their votes near the end of their terms.
Finally, we conclude by noting several considerations that are outside
the scope of our analysis—such as the political viability of any particular
plan, legal considerations relevant to the choice between plans, and goals
such as depoliticization of confirmations that are not subject to empirical
simulations. Given these constraints, our goal is not to offer a definitive
conclusion as to which proposal is best, all things considered. Instead, our
goal is to explain the concrete design choices that should be made, illustrate
ways those can be assessed, and assess them. Our findings should inform
future reform proposals, and any future plan can be assessed using our
framework.
I. THE CASE FOR TERM LIMITS
We begin by explaining the current system of life tenure for Supreme
Court Justices and describing the calls that have emerged for the adoption of
term limits. After providing this background, we present descriptive statistics
on the appointment and tenure of Justices on the Supreme Court that have
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motivated the push for adopting term limits.
A. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING TERM LIMITS
The Constitution never uses the phrase “life tenure.” Instead, it provides
that “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour.”16 Nonetheless, this provision has been read
as meaning that judges and Justices serve for life unless they are impeached
by the House of Representatives and convicted by a two-thirds vote in favor
of removal by the Senate.17 This reading is not beyond debate,18 but it has
been consistently followed since the founding of the United States.19
Why grant judges life tenure—especially given that holders of all other
federal constitutional offices serve for fixed and limited terms?20 The basic
argument in favor of life tenure is that it will guarantee judicial
independence. One complaint that led to the American Revolution was that
colonial judges, unlike judges in England, were not sufficiently independent
because they served at the pleasure of the Crown.21 As the Declaration of
Independence states, King George had “made Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
17. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 987 (2007) (describing the “traditional understanding” under which
“an Article III judge can be involuntarily removed from office only by the constitutionally specified
mechanisms of impeachment”).
18. The leading argument that “good Behaviour” does not mean “life tenure” is found in Saikrishna
Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72 (2006). Even those who
are not persuaded by this argument acknowledge that the meaning of the Good Behavior Clause is not
crystal clear. Martin Redish, in his response to Prakash and Smith, in which he defends the traditional
view, suggests that this clause “could well be the most mysterious provision in the United States
Constitution.” Martin H. Redish, Response: Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations
of American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139, 139 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 777 (“Life tenure for Supreme Court Justices
has been a part of our Constitution since 1789, when the Framers created one Supreme Court and provided
that its members ‘shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.’ ”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 69 (1989) (“The good
behavior clause meant to guarantee that federal judges receive life tenure . . . .”); David R. Stras & Ryan
W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1405
(2005) (“Records from the founding era in America confirm that Article III, Section 1 granted life tenure
for well-behaved judges.”).
20. The President and Vice President serve for terms of four years. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. After
the Twenty-Second Amendment, no President may serve for more than two terms. Id. amend. XXII, § 1.
Senators serve for terms of six years, id. art. I, § 3, and Representatives serve for two years, id. art I, § 2.
The Constitution imposes no term limits (here, used to mean limits on the number of terms that someone
can serve) on federal legislative offices, and the Supreme Court has struck down state efforts to impose
term limits on those offices. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
21. See Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061,
1064 (2007) (noting that “colonial judges still served at the pleasure of the crown, not during good
behavior” a fact “that led Americans to believe that they were being treated as second-class subjects”).
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salaries.”22
The Constitution’s solution was to guarantee independence by granting
tenure during “good Behaviour,” as well as to provide that judicial
compensation could not be reduced during a judge’s “Continuance in
Office.”23 Defending the newly drafted Constitution, Alexander Hamilton
wrote that good-behavior tenure was “the best expedient which can be
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.”24 In Hamilton’s view, “nothing can contribute
so much to [the judiciary’s] firmness and independence as permanency in
office,” making that guarantee “an indispensable ingredient in its
constitution.”25
Even before the Constitution became law, critics of life tenure emerged.
Anti-Federalists attacked the Good Behavior Clause on the ground that it
made the judiciary too independent.26 The author known as Brutus, for
example, stressed that judges would be “rendered totally independent, both
of the people and the legislature, both with respect to their offices and
salaries,” which would provide no sanction for “erroneous adjudications.”27
The skepticism did not end with constitutional ratification. Proposals to
replace life tenure for federal judges with term limits have been introduced
in Congress at various points in American history starting in the early
nineteenth century.28
Supreme Court term limits attracted renewed interest in the mid-2000s,
when a number of proposals for staggered eighteen-year terms emerged.29
Although such a reform had first been proposed in the 1980s by Philip
Oliver,30 it may have become particularly attractive given the circumstances
two decades later: between 1994 and 2005, there were no vacancies on the
Supreme Court, the second longest period of continuous membership in
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
25. Id. at 570.
26. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Judicial Independence, Judicial Virtue, and the Political Economy of
the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 48 (2012) (“Some Anti-Federalists objected that the
power of judicial review, together with life tenure, could lead to profound judicial usurpations of
power.”).
27. Brutus XI, N.Y. J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 417
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
28. See Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the Article III Judge,
39 GONZ. L. REV. 131, 142–45 (2003).
29. See generally Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7;
DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 7.
30. See Oliver, supra note 7, at 800–01.
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American history.31 Reformers also stressed that Supreme Court Justices in
recent decades had been staying on the Court longer as U.S. life expectancies
had increased.32 As Calabresi and Lindgren argued, “[t]his trend has led to
significantly less frequent vacancies on the Court, which reduces the efficacy
of the democratic check that the appointment process provides on the Court’s
membership.”33
Moreover, the timing of Justices’ deaths and retirements can lead to a
Court in which one party or the other’s nominees are disproportionately
represented in light of their electoral success. For instance, critics of the
current system of life tenure such as Erwin Chemerinsky have observed that
“a president’s ability to select Justices is based on the fortuity of when
vacancies occur.”34 The problem with this state of affairs “is not one of
fairness to presidential administrations or political parties” but rather “lies in
its unfairness to the voters who elect a given president to a given term.”35
This might be less of a problem if Supreme Court Justices’ ideologies did
not closely track the partisan affiliation of the appointing president, but there
is overwhelming evidence that they do.36 This means in practice that the
ideological composition of the Court bears only an indirect relationship to
the outcomes of national elections. Term limits alone would not solve this
problem. But terms of the appropriate length appropriately staggered to
equalize each presidential term’s impact on the Supreme Court could
alleviate this problem.
In addition to these primary arguments, reformers have raised a number
of other concerns about life tenure. First, reformers argue that life tenure has
led to Justices staying on the Court well into old age when the possibility of
mental deterioration increases.37 Second, reformers argue that life tenure
incentivizes presidents to choose younger appointees to maximize their
impact on the Court.38 For appointing presidents, this raises concerns that
Justices drift ideologically or shift their decision-making in unpredictable
31. See Michael Comiskey, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: Lessons from Filling the
Rehnquist and O’Connor Vacancies, 41 PS: POL. SCI. & POLS. 355, 355 (2008).
32. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 310; Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 770–71;
Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court Needs Term Limits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-06/kavanaugh-confirmation-supreme-court-needs-termlimits [https://perma.cc/2VM5-SGVQ].
33. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 771.
34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 311.
35. DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 7, at 1117.
36. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 5 (2007).
37. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 815–18; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7, at
468; see also Garrow, supra note 2; Gregg Easterbrook, Geritol Justice: Is the Supreme Court Senile?,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19 & 26, 1991, at 17, 18.
38. See DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 7, at 1110–16.
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and often, from a political perspective, undesirable ways.39 Third, reformers
argue that life tenure encourages strategic behavior by Justices seeking to
time their retirements so as to enable an ideologically friendly president to
pick their replacement.40 Fourth, reformers argue that life tenure makes the
composition of the Court’s membership turn on random and unpredictable
events, such as deaths and health-related retirements.41 Fifth, reformers
argue that life tenure leads to longer terms and therefore fewer vacancies,
which means that political battles over the vacancies that do arise are
particularly contentious.42 Finally, some reformers have even argued that life
tenure and the resulting long tenures make Supreme Court Justices more
arrogant and self-regarding,43 which may in turn alter their decision-making.
Given these concerns with life tenure, reformers have put forward a
number of term-limits proposals that they argue would address these
concerns. The most common version of these term-limits proposals calls for
staggered eighteen-year terms. Under these plans, each president would be
entitled to two appointments per term, regularizing the appointments process
and reducing the role of random events. Eighteen-year terms would prevent
Justices from sitting until very old age and remove most advantages for
presidents to appoint extremely young—and, thus, less experienced—
nominees. And because each president would be entitled to two
appointments per term, the political stakes over each appointment would be
reduced. Eighteen-year terms would also encourage more regular turnover,
bringing fresh perspectives to the Court44 and increasing the connection
between the U.S. electorate and the Court composition.
Life tenure does have some significant defenders.45 Some others argue
that there are problems with the current system but favor different reforms.46
But many—including large cross-sections of the public—seem to find the
arguments in favor of term limits persuasive. Recent surveys have found
between sixty and seventy-eight percent of Americans agree with the notion
that Supreme Court Justices should serve for fixed or limited terms instead
39. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important, 101 NW. U. L. REV.
1483 (2007).
40. See DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 7, at 1101–10.
41. See id. at 1116–19.
42. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 8; Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7, at 468.
43. See, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7, at 468–69.
44. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 311.
45. See generally Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 407; Stras & Scott, supra note 19; David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis
of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007).
46. See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 15; Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the
Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 173–74 (2019).
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of life.47 Term limits are also the only major reform that has attracted support
across the political spectrum, and prominent conservative legal thinkers
recently have endorsed them or at least expressed some openness to them.48
Even if it is hard to imagine any Supreme Court reform being implemented
in the near term given the current partisan configuration, term limits seem
like the only reform that might be possible.
B. TRENDS SUPPORTING TERM LIMITS
The case for adopting term limits is motivated in part by trends in the
appointment and length of service of Justices on the Supreme Court. To
illustrate these trends and to set the stage for our simulations reported in Part
III, we use the Federal Judicial Center for all biographical data on judges,
including the terms served by Justices, their ages, and their lifespans.49 We
also use data from Wikipedia on the political party controlling the White
House and the Senate in each year.
For both this exercise and our simulations, we use 1937 as the starting
point of our analysis. This is to account for the reality that patterns of service
on the Supreme Court have evolved dramatically over time. For instance,
one of the inaugural Justices on the Supreme Court, John Routledge, left the
Supreme Court after just a year to serve as Chief Justice of the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas and Sessions.50 In another example, in
47. See New Nationwide Marquette Law School Poll Finds Confidence in U.S. Supreme Court
Overall, Though More Pronounced Among Conservatives, MARQUETTE UNIV. (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.marquette.edu/news-center/2019/new-nationwide-mu-law-school-poll-finds-confidence-inus-supreme-court-overall.php [https://perma.cc/7AKJ-R2EU] (noting that thirty-four percent of
respondents strongly favored and thirty-eight percent favored requiring Supreme Court Justices to “serve
a fixed term on the court rather than serving life terms”); ROBERT GREEN & ADAM ROSENBLATT, FIX
THE COURT, AGENDA OF KEY FINDINGS 3 (2018), https://fixthecourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/
10/October-2018-TL-poll-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/38AT-L7AD] (finding that seventy-eight percent
of respondents supported “restrictions on length of service for U.S. Supreme Court Justices, for example,
setting a retirement age or capping total years of service”); Lee Epstein, James L. Gibson & Michael J.
Nelson, Public Response to Proposals to Reform the Supreme Court 2–3 (Oct. 2020) (unpublished report
prepared for the New York Times) (available at https://perma.cc/9ES2-8NRY) (finding sixty percent
support among survey respondents for “[h]av[ing] justices serve a fixed term on the Supreme Court—
like six or eight years—rather than serving life terms”).
48. Will Baude, One Cheer for Supreme Court Term Limits, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 26, 2020,
6:30 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/26/one-cheer-for-supreme-court-term-limits [https://per
ma.cc/QX4V-D8ZU]; Steven G. Calabresi, End the Poisonous Process of Picking Supreme Court
Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/opinion/ginsburg-supremecourt-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/LL8C-MTL4]; see also Ilya Shapiro, Term Limits Won’t Fix
the Court, ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/term-limitswont-fix-court/616402 [https://perma.cc/NAS2-F5HW].
49. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/R5JB-LJSX].
50. Routledge later returned to the Supreme Court to serve as Chief Justice for a mere 138 days
under a recess appointment before being rejected by the Senate. See Rutledge, John, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/rutledge-john [https://perma.cc/U9GB-9KA6].
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1812, Joseph Story was appointed to the Court at just thirty-two years old—
a record unlikely to ever be broken in modern times.51 We thus elected to
focus on more recent patterns in service on the Court. We decided to
specifically start our analysis in 1937 since that was the year President
Roosevelt advanced his ultimately unsuccessful court-packing plan,52 and it
is the year that many legal experts consider the beginning of the modern era
of the Supreme Court.53 That said, we recognize that this starting point is
admittedly arbitrary.
To begin, we examine how the number of Justices appointed to the
Supreme Court varies by presidential term. To do so, Figure 1 reports the
number of Justices appointed during each four-year presidential term from
1937 through 2020. For this Figure, the x-axis breaks terms into four-year
periods, even if two presidents held office during that term. For example,
although Lyndon Johnson served as president for the latter part of the term
for which John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960, we group 1961 to 1964 as
a single term. The numbers directly above the x-axis list the total number of
Justices appointed in each term. The bars are colored blue for Democratic
presidents and red for Republican presidents. (Throughout, we use red to
refer to Republican-appointed Justices and blue to refer to Democraticappointed Justices.) For a given president, the different shadings of the bars
indicate the different Justices that the president appointed. For example,
there is one colored bar for Reagan’s first term because he appointed one
Justice in the term, but there are two colored bars for Reagan’s second term
because he appointed two Justices in that term.
51. See Story, Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/story-joseph
[https://perma.cc/HCN3-ANTU].
52. For detailed examinations of this episode, see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010) and BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE
COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (2009).
53. The year 1937 has been previously described as the beginning of the “modern era” of the
Supreme Court because it was then that the Supreme Court seemed to acquiesce to the constitutionality
of President Roosevelt’s New Deal initiatives, thus ushering in today’s regulatory state. See 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40 (1991) (“All of us live in the modern era that begins with
the Supreme Court’s ‘switch in time’ in 1937, in which an activist, regulatory state is finally accepted as
an unchallengeable constitutional reality.”).
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FIGURE 1. Number of Justices and Justice-Years Appointed by Presidential
Term, 1937 to 2020

During the twenty-one four-year presidential terms between 1937 and
2020, a total of thirty-nine Justices were appointed to the Supreme Court.
(On average, one Justice was appointed every twenty-six months, which
translates to an average of 1.8 Justices appointed each four-year presidential
term.) However, there is considerable variation in the number of Justices
appointed by presidential terms, from zero appointments being made in four
terms—Carter’s only term, Clinton’s second term, George W. Bush’s first
term, and Obama’s second term—to five appointments made in Roosevelt’s
second term and three appointments made in Donald Trump’s single term.
Comparing the simple number of appointments from each presidential
term is one way to gauge the influence of different presidents on the Court’s
composition, but it ignores differences in the length of time that the
appointed Justices serve. Thus, another measure of representation is Justiceyears. This measure counts the total number of years served by Justices for
each president. This measurement accounts for the fact that not all
appointments are equal in terms of influence. Because a Justice who serves
for a long period can influence the law for much longer after the president
who appointed her leaves office, an appointing president might consider that
appointee more valuable than one who serves for only a short period.
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Figure 1 also reports the number of Justice-years appointed by each
presidential term. In total, the forty Justices appointed during these twentyone presidential terms have served for a combined 718 Justice-years. On
average, each presidential term has made appointments lasting thirty-four
Justice-years. As with appointments generally, however, there is also
considerable variation in the Justice-years by presidential term. For example,
the four Justices appointed in Roosevelt’s second term served for a combined
121 years.
Although there are only small differences by party since 1937, it is
possible that the relative shares of Justice-years over eighteen years by party
have changed over time. Across the twenty-one presidential terms since
1937, Republican presidents have appointed twenty out of forty Justices and
those Justices have served fifty-four percent of Justice-years. In recent
decades, however, a disparity has emerged. For instance, of the Justices
appointed since Richard Nixon took office in 1969, fifteen out of nineteen
Justices were appointed by Republicans and those Justices have served
seventy-seven percent of Justice-years.
In addition to concern over equity in the appointment of Justices across
presidential terms, another factor that has been cited to justify term limits is
the increasing number of years that individual Justices serve.54 To illustrate
these trends, Figure 2 graphs the years of service for Justices based on their
appointment year.55 To make the patterns more clear, Figure 2 includes
points for each Justice and a line capturing the overall relationship between
year of appointment and number of years served. The results in Figure 2
reveal a clear increase in the average number of years of service over time.
For instance, the Justices appointed between 1937 and 1950 served an
average of 15.7 years, but the Justices appointed since 1990 who have since
left the bench served an average of 26.3 years.56 In addition, across all
Justices who retired since 1937, the average length of time on the bench is
19.1 years and the median length of time is 18.5 years. Given that the median
length is more than eighteen years, an eighteen-year term limit would have
cut short over half of all appointments.
54. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 815–18. See generally Garrow, supra note 2.
55. We made two choices about how to report currently sitting Justices to ensure that the fact that
the sitting Justices have not yet served a full term does not bias our results: (1) we exclude all Justices
appointed after Justice Breyer’s confirmation in 1994 and (2) we assume that Justice Breyer and Justice
Thomas serve until 2020.
56. This number will increase as Justices Breyer and Thomas continue to serve on the Court.
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FIGURE 2. Years of Service of Supreme Court Justices Appointed Between
1937 and 1994

As a more direct assessment of how often term limits would potentially
limit the tenure of Justices, Figure 3 shows the distribution of years of
experience at the Justice-year level from 1937 to 2020. In the Figure, an
individual Supreme Court Justice would be counted for each year they
served. For example, the first year that a given Justice served on the Court
(for example, Justice Ginsburg in 1993) would be included in the bar for zero
years of experience, the second year that a given Justice served on the Court
(for example, Justice Ginsburg in 1994) would be included in the bar for one
year of experience, and so on. The y-axis represents the number of Justiceyears at each corresponding level of year of experience. To break out the
results by political party of the appointing president, the bars are colored blue
for Democratic presidents and red for Republican presidents. Because we are
interested here in how often Justices are serving past eighteen years, the bars
have darker shading after the eighteen-year mark.
The results in Figure 3 reveal that twenty-three percent of the Justiceyears served on the Supreme Court occur after a given Justice has already
served for eighteen years. An eighteen-year term limit would thus have
impacted roughly a quarter of the Justice-years served on the Supreme Court.
Or, to state the effect in a different way, the Justices who would have been
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affected by eighteen-year term limits (those who served longer than eighteen
years) would have had their tenures cut short by 6.0 years on average.
FIGURE 3. Years of Experience at the Justice-Year Level by Political Party
of Appointing President, 1937 to 2020

A related inquiry is whether term limits would affect Justices appointed
by one political party more than the other. If, for example, term limits would
disproportionately have limited the tenures of Republican-appointed
Justices, we might expect Republicans to be less willing to support term
limits in the future. Figure 3 assesses this possibility by breaking out results
by the political party of the appointing president. These results show that the
share of Justice-years by party is similar before and after the eighteen-year
mark. More specifically, forty-six percent of all Justice-years were served by
Justices appointed by Democratic presidents, and forty-three percent of
Justice-years after a given Justice had been on the Court eighteen years were
served by Justices appointed by Democratic presidents.
To assess the variation in Justices serving more than eighteen years by
party over time, Figure 4 reports the years served for each Justice. The bars
are colored by the party of the appointing president with the darker area
indicating the years after which a Justice has served eighteen years. At the
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bottom of the figure is a distribution of the number of Justices that have been
serving for more than eighteen years over time, organized by year.57
FIGURE 4. Length of Supreme Court Tenure by Justice, 1937 to 2020

57. This distribution is created by simply adding up the number of Justices in the given year in the
top part of Figure 4.
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Figure 4 reveals that there are considerable differences in the relative
shares of Justice-years over eighteen years of service by party over time.
Between 1950 and 1970, only Justices appointed by Democratic presidents
served past eighteen years; from the early 1990s through 2010, only Justices
appointed by Republican presidents served past eighteen years; and since
2010, Justices appointed by presidents from both parties have served longer
than eighteen years.
FIGURE 5. Retirements and Deaths by Shared Justice and President
Ideology, 1937 to 2020

Finally, because preventing strategic retirements is one argument for
term limits, we examine the role that strategic departures play in vacancies
to the Supreme Court.58 To do so, Figure 5 reports the number of Justices
that left the Court when the president was of the same party as the Justice’s
58. It is worth noting that, just like some of the Justices that retire, some of the Justices that die
while serving on the Supreme Court still may be engaging in a strategic calculation. For instance, a Justice
may elect to not retire early in the term of a president with whom she shares an ideology because she
knows that, if she dies prematurely, she will be replaced by a Justice that shares her ideology. Similarly,
a Justice may stay on the Court despite serious health consequences that counsel in favor of retirement if
she would prefer that the sitting president not nominate her replacement.
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appointing president, separately by whether the Justice died in office or
retired. The size of the marker in any given year corresponds to the number
of Justices. For this analysis, we consider all Republican presidents
conservative and all Democratic presidents liberal; and we consider Justices
liberal or conservative based on their Martin-Quinn score at the time of their
retirement. Justices with a negative (and thus liberal) Martin-Quinn score are
assumed to share ideological leanings with Democratic presidents, and
Justices with a positive (and thus conservative) Martin-Quinn score are
assumed to share ideological leanings with Republican presidents. We use
ideology at the time of a Justice’s retirement instead of at the time of the
Justice’s appointment to account for the fact that a Justice’s ideology may
evolve over time. For example, even though Justice David Souter was
appointed by George H.W. Bush, he consistently voted with the Court’s
liberal bloc by the end of his tenure. His decision to retire at the beginning
of the Obama presidency thus should be seen as a likely strategic retirement.
The results in Figure 5 reveal that ten Justices have died while still
serving on the Supreme Court between 1937 and 2020. Of the Justices that
died, six (or sixty percent) were appointed by a president of the same party
as the sitting president. During that same period, twenty-nine Justices retired
from the Court. Of the Justices who retired, seventeen (or fifty-nine percent)
were appointed by a president of the same party as the sitting president.59
II. DESIGNING PROPOSALS
Given the concerns outlined above about the current system of life
tenure for Supreme Court Justices, several proposals have been put forward
by academics and reform advocates to impose limits on the length of their
terms. This Part documents the nine key design decisions that any proposal
should confront, summarizes prominent existing proposals, and outlines
several dimensions along which it is possible to evaluate the impact that
proposals have on the composition of the Supreme Court.
59. One study concluded that strategic retirement had increased over American history. Artemus
Ward’s 2003 study of Supreme Court retirement concluded that after Congress expanded the Justices’
retirement benefits in 1955, “partisanship became the dominant recurrent factor in the departure process.”
ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 19 (2003). That pattern appears to have continued since Ward published his study.
Every Justice who voluntarily retired since 2003 has done so under conditions that enabled the
appointment of an ideologically similar replacement (though not necessarily one of the same political
party). Conservative Justices O’Connor and Kennedy retired under Republican presidents; liberal Justices
Stevens and Souter retired under a Democratic president.
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A. DESIGN DECISIONS
Term-limits proposals must solve several predictable problems. More
specifically, we identify nine key design decisions that define and distinguish
different term-limits proposals. In laying out these design decisions, we
provide a framework that can be used to analyze any potential term-limits
reform.
1. Term Length
The most salient design decision a proposal must make is how long the
Justices’ terms will last. There are a number of tradeoffs associated with
different term lengths. For instance, shorter terms—such as twelve years—
would create greater turnover on the Court, and by doing so, may ensure that
the Court’s membership is more reflective of the current political mood of
the country. In contrast, longer terms—such as twenty-seven years—would
create more continuity on the Court, and by doing so, may help ensure
greater doctrinal consistency and alleviate concerns that Justices’ interest in
future employment or prospects for higher office would distort their
decision-making. Moreover, only certain term lengths, combined with
appropriate staggering, will ensure that each president gets the opportunity
to appoint the same number of Justices.60 Although the case could, and has,
been made for a number of different term lengths, most recent commentators
have converged on staggered eighteen-year terms as the preferred reform.61
2. Appointment Timing
Another decision is to determine when appointments will be made. One
option is to have presidents make a new appointment every two years,
typically in the first and third year of a presidential term. Another option is
to limit Justices’ terms to eighteen years but not take any steps to regularize
when the new appointments occur, leaving vacancies to arise naturally when
term limits expire. Yet another option is to allow presidents to nominate two
Justices per term but allow those nominations to occur at any time—or even
stipulate that those appointments do not go into effect until the start of the
subsequent presidential administration.
60. With a nine-Justice court, staggered nine-year, twelve-year, eighteen-year, and thirty-six-year
terms lead to four, three, two, and one appointment per term, respectively, assuming no unexpected deaths
or retirements.
61. See infra Section II.B.
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3. Transition Timing
Proposals must also specify when the process of transitioning to termlimits appointments should commence. One option is to have the plan go into
effect immediately upon passage of a term-limits statute or constitutional
amendment (which, as we discuss below, are both ways that reformers have
suggested that such a proposal may be enacted). Another option is to have
the proposal go into effect at some later date, such as at the start of the next
presidential term or after the Justices on the Court at the time of passage have
all served some amount of time (for example, after they have all completed
eighteen years of service or after all the Justices on the Court at the time of
passage have retired).
4. Legacy Justices
In addition to specifying the timing of the transition, a related design
decision is how to handle the terms of the “legacy” Justices that are serving
on the Court when the proposal is enacted. As noted above, one option is to
specify that term-limits appointments do not go into effect until all the
current Justices leave the Court. Another option is to allow the legacy
Justices to retain life tenure and only begin adding new Justices that will
serve staggered eighteen-year terms (this would likely result in a Court with
more than nine Justices during a transition period). Yet another option is to
have legacy Justices transition off the Court in order of seniority as new
Justices are appointed. Importantly, given that the Justices currently on the
Court were appointed under a system of life tenure, this design choice may
have implications for the constitutionality of any reform passed by statute
even if one believes such reform is permissible as a general matter.
5. Unexpected Vacancies
Another important design decision is how a proposal addresses
unexpected vacancies. That is, what happens under the proposal when a
Justice leaves the Court—either due to death, voluntary retirement, or
removal through impeachment—before the end of the specified term? One
option is simply to have fewer members on the Court for the remainder of
the departing Justices’ term. That is, if a term-limited Justice appointed in
2021 would be expected to leave the Court in 2039, that Justice’s unexpected
death in 2037 would lead to an eight-Justice Court for two years. Another
option, though, is to allow for a Justice to be appointed to fill the remainder
of the term. This appointment could be made by the current president, or one
could imagine some requirement that the replacement Justice be approved
by the party that initially appointed the Justice in order to minimize the role
of random events on the Court’s jurisprudence. For example, if a Justice was
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appointed by a Republican president and the current president is a Democrat,
the plan could require the appointment to be approved by the Republican
leader in the Senate. Other options include allowing senior Justices whose
terms have finished to return to active service on the Court until the next
appointment is made on the specified schedule.
6. Senior Justices
A term-limits reform should also address the role of senior Justices after
the end of their term. One option is to make these Justices permanent
members of a circuit court. Another option is to give these Justices the same
status of the Justices that retire under the current system (that is, they may
be allowed to retain office space, hire a clerk, and sit by designation on
federal courts around the country). Yet another option is to permit these
Justices to rejoin the Court for a limited period of time when an unexpected
vacancy arises. Another possibility is for the plan to include provisions that
restrict the activities of Justices after they are no longer active members of
the Court—restrictions that would be designed to avoid any appearance of
corruption (for example, a provision barring later employment for entities
with business before the Court).62 Importantly, however, any reform not
passed through a constitutional amendment must find a role for the termlimited Justices that does not run afoul of the Constitution’s current
requirement that Justices serve for a period of good behavior.63
7. Senate Impasses
Even if a term-limits reform specifies when Supreme Court seats
become vacant and when the president may nominate a new Justice, it does
not follow that the Senate will automatically confirm the president’s
nominee. If the Senate is controlled by a different party than the president,
the majority leader may instead elect to not schedule a confirmation vote—
just as Republican Majority Leader Mitch McConnell did when President
Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland to fill the seat created when
Justice Antonin Scalia died in 2016. Without some solution to this problem,
“instituting staggered term limits could spectacularly backfire.”64
62. Cf. Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 1425 (arguing that “fixed, nonrenewable terms . . . would
introduce incentives for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a way that improves their prospects for
future employment outside the judiciary”).
63. Cramton has argued that his and Carrington’s proposal is consistent with the Constitution
because Justices would have commissions for life but would spend the first part of their tenure serving
on the Supreme Court and the remainder serving on lower courts. See Roger C. Cramton, Constitutionality
of Reforming the Supreme Court by Statute, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 345, 359 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
64. Shapiro, supra note 48.
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Reformers may hope that changing term limits may also change the
norms of confirmation votes. That is, by establishing that each presidential
term is “entitled” to two Court vacancies, it may lessen the incentives for the
Senate to refuse to consider one of the president’s nominees. But one option
is to place less faith in norms and instead provide for some other policy in
the event the Senate does not confirm a nominee in a set amount of time.
This could include allowing the president to directly appoint the candidate
of their choosing, or it could involve giving that power to a third party of
some kind. One particularly mischievous (though quite possibly effective)
attempt to address these problems is to require the president and the Senate
to be “confined together until a nominee has been approved” while imposing
a “salary and benefits freeze” on all of them.65
8. Chief Justices
Proposals should also decide how the Chief Justice will be designated.
One possibility is to have the Justice appointed to fill the vacancy created by
the departing Chief Justice assume the role. Under this system, as with the
status quo, whether a president is able to appoint the Chief Justice will
depend on the happenstance of when the vacancy becomes available.
Alternatively, the plans could instead provide that the most senior of the
active Justices will serve as the Chief Justice, or the most senior member of
the party that has appointed the most Justices to the Court. One could also
imagine a system similar to that used by the courts of appeals, in which the
most senior judge below the age of sixty-five becomes the chief judge for a
seven-year term.66 Or the plan could simply allow the Justices to elect their
own chief.67
9. Enactment Method
A final important design decision is whether a plan will be implemented
by passing a statute or through the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
The majority of proposals rest on the assumption that term limits are
inconsistent with Article III’s guarantee of tenure during “good Behaviour,”
making a constitutional amendment necessary. But some scholars argue that
there are ways to effectively create term limits through a statute alone.68
While this choice is quite significant, how to resolve it rests on constitutional
considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article. Our focus, instead,
65. Calabresi, supra note 48.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 45 (providing procedures for selection of chief judges for circuit courts).
67. For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved in changing the way the Chief Justice is
designated, see generally Judith Resnik & Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit: Limiting the
Powers and the Term of the Chief Justice of the United States, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1575 (2006).
68. See generally, e.g., Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7.
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is on the practical effect each proposal would have if successfully
implemented.
B. EXISTING PROPOSALS
Over the last several decades, several major term-limits proposals have
been put forward. These proposals each make concrete choices for at least
some of the nine design decisions we outlined above, but they also typically
leave some of these decisions either ambiguous or unaddressed. We outline
several of the most prominent proposals below.
1. Oliver’s Proposal
The first scholar to lay out the basic framework of the dominant termlimits proposals was Philip Oliver. In a 1986 article, Oliver offered a draft
constitutional amendment that would “replace life tenure for Supreme Court
Justices with a system of fixed, staggered terms.”69 As he put it, “[t]he
primary features of the proposal are that Justices should serve for staggered
eighteen-year terms, and that if a Justice did not serve his full term, a
successor would be appointed only to fill out the remainder of the term.”70
Vacancies would be staggered such that one seat would open up each oddnumbered year.
Oliver’s proposal has a number of key features. Notably, it would limit
the tenure of Justices already appointed at the time of enactment—that is, it
would not accommodate the legacy Justices. The proposal does, however,
include a lag of approximately five years before it becomes effective: the
most senior Justice on the Court would be required to leave on the third oddnumbered year after enactment.71 So, for example, if the plan were enacted
in 2021 or 2022 and no current Justices retired or died, Justice Thomas would
vacate his seat in August of 2027, to be replaced by a new Justice who would
serve an eighteen-year term.
Another important detail is how the proposal handles unexpected
vacancies. If a Justice dies or retires outside of the normal schedule, Oliver’s
proposal provides that a replacement Justice will be appointed who serves
out the rest of the predecessor’s term. So, if the plan were enacted in 2021
and Justice Breyer retired in 2022, his replacement would serve only until
2029, when a new Justice would be appointed for a full eighteen-year term.
If that Justice were to leave the Court after ten years, she would be replaced
by a temporary Justice who would serve for eight years. Temporary Justices
69.
70.
71.

Oliver, supra note 7, at 800.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 801.
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may not be reappointed for full eighteen-year terms. The only exception to
these rules is that, where a replacement Justice is being appointed to a seat
that would become vacant during the same presidential term, the new
appointee would serve for somewhat longer than eighteen years. If, say,
Justice Thomas were to leave the Court in 2025 before his seat expired in
2027, the president elected in 2024 would replace him with a Justice who
would serve until 2045.
2. The UVA Plan
Oliver’s proposal was revived two decades later by two University of
Virginia law students, James DiTullio and John Schochet, in a Virginia Law
Review student note.72 Their proposed constitutional amendment (which we
refer to as the “UVA Plan”) has much in common with Oliver’s, but with a
couple of key differences.
One relates to the timing of the transition. Although their plan would,
like Oliver’s, limit the tenure of existing Justices, the mechanics are slightly
different. The plan would take effect on the first odd-numbered year
following ratification, and then the most senior Justice’s tenure would end
“on the third day of January of the first even-numbered year following the
effective date of this Amendment and commencing after that Justice has
served for at least eighteen years on the Supreme Court.”73 At that point,
each remaining Justice would leave every two years, from most to least
senior. In other words, so long as the most senior Justice had already served
for eighteen years upon the amendment’s ratification, the UVA Plan would
become operative more quickly than Oliver’s.
Another important difference is that the UVA Plan makes no
allowances for short-term appointments that would expire during the
appointing president’s term. Whereas Oliver’s plan simply allows those
Justices to serve for somewhat longer than eighteen years, the UVA Plan
would require an interim appointment who would serve for a short period
and who could not be reappointed to a full term.74 This could lead to
differences for the ideology of Justices in some scenarios. Under Oliver’s
plan, if a vacancy opened up on the Court in the second year of a presidential
term, the president would be able to fill it with an appointee who would serve
for nineteen years. Under the UVA Plan, the president would pick a shortterm appointee and then would make a new appointment the following year.
Given that the president’s party often (though not always) loses seats in the
72.
73.
74.

See generally DiTullio & Schochet, supra note 7.
Id. at 1147.
See id. at 1146.
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Senate in midterm elections,75 the UVA Plan might lead to nominees who
are more ideologically moderate in such scenarios but also might have a
greater chance of producing Senate impasses.
3. The Northwestern Plan
Another proposal comes from Northwestern University School of Law
professors Stephen Calabresi and James Lindgren. Like the Oliver and
Virginia proposals, this one (the “Northwestern Plan”) is also a constitutional
amendment that calls for eighteen-year terms. But the proposal has some key
differences from other proposals. Most importantly, it would not apply to
legacy Justices on the ground that “retroactive application . . . would be both
unfair and unnecessary.”76 All Justices currently serving at the time the
proposal was enacted would retain life tenure.
This choice has consequences for the plan’s transition because it takes
much longer to establish a schedule of staggered eighteen-year terms. The
authors propose that each new appointment after the amendment would
occupy the “next open slot” in order to make the eighteen-year cycle work.77
Imagine that the plan became operative in 2021. If the first retirement
occurred in 2022, the new Justice would be appointed to the eighteen-year
slot that begins in 2023—meaning that Justice would serve for nineteen
years. If the next vacancy arose in 2023, the new Justice would be appointed
for the slot that began in 2025. And so on.
Under the Northwestern Plan, term-limited Justices would receive their
salary for life and would be permitted to sit as judges on the lower courts for
life.78 In the event of unexpected vacancies, an interim Justice would be
appointed to fill out the rest of the term, and that appointee would be
ineligible for reappointment for a full term.79
4. The Renewal Act
Roger Cramton and Paul Carrington have proposed their own eighteenyear term-limit plan (which we refer to as the “Renewal Act,” the name they
gave their draft statute).80 The proposal has a significant difference from
those described thus far: it is an ordinary statute, not a constitutional
75. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman, Thomas L. Brunell & William Koetzle, Why Gain in the Senate
but Midterm Loss in the House? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 79, 79 (1998)
(noting that “[m]idterm loss in the Senate is very likely, but it is not as consistent a phenomenon as in the
House”).
76. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 826.
77. Id. at 826–27.
78. Id. at 775.
79. Id. at 827.
80. See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7, at 471.
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amendment. Despite the common view that life tenure is constitutionally
required, Cramton and Carrington argue that features of their reform mean it
could be implemented through statutory means consistent with the
Constitution.81 Their proposal would work as follows. First, all legacy
Justices would retain life tenure. Vacancies would be filled as per usual once
those Justices died or retired until the last grandfathered Justice left the
Court. At that point, the system of regularized appointments every oddnumbered year would begin.
Interestingly, no Justice would be “term-limited” from the Court; all
Justices would keep their titles and judicial roles for life. But the system
would effectively create an eighteen-year term. This is because if at any point
there were more than nine Justices on the Court, only the nine most junior
would participate in the ordinary work of hearing merits cases. In practice,
after eighteen years of service, any given Justice would be bumped out of
the nine most junior Justices, as nine appointments would have been made
since that Justice’s appointment. Senior Justices would still be permitted to
sit on the Court in cases of recusal or temporary disability by the active
Justices, and would be called up in reverse order of seniority. They also
would sit as circuit judges and participate in other work of the Supreme
Court, such as approving amendments to the Federal Rules. In the event of
an unexpected death or retirement that left the Court with fewer than nine
Justices, the president would be permitted to make an extra appointment that
would take the place of the next regularly scheduled appointment.82
5. Justices on Deck
The advocacy organization Fix the Court has proposed a reform that
looks quite similar to the Renewal Act proposal but which has a couple of
key differences. Under this proposal, the cycle of appointments every two
years would begin immediately upon enactment.83 The term limits would
apply to new Justices, but not the legacy Justices. Once an eighteen-year
term expires, a Justice would become senior and serve on the lower courts.
During their eighteen-year terms, however, they would sit on the Court only
once they were among the nine most senior Justices on the bench.84 In
practice, this would mean that some of the early new appointments would
have short tenures on the Supreme Court. Depending on how long it took for
legacy Justices to retire, an early appointee could spend a sizable chunk of
81. See generally Cramton, supra note 63.
82. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7.
83. See One Way Our Term Limits Bill Could Be Implemented, FIX THE CT. (Sept. 20, 2020),
https://fixthecourt.com/2020/09/term-limits [https://perma.cc/2SL4-XZ9Q].
84. Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7.

30

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1

her eighteen-year term waiting “on deck” to become one of the nine most
senior Justices.
6. The Khanna Bill
Fix the Court has also developed a different proposal, a version of
which has now been introduced into Congress by Representative Ro Khanna
(the “Khanna Bill”).85 As with the prior proposal, appointments would begin
immediately and legacy Justices would not be subject to term limits. Unlike
the previous proposal, however, there would be no requirement that only the
nine most senior Justices sit and decide cases during the transition period.
What this means is that, unlike the other proposals discussed thus far, the
Supreme Court could have more than nine actively participating Justices
during the transition period—in theory as many as eighteen, if every Justice
on the Court upon the bill’s enactment remained on the Court for eighteen
more years. After the transition, senior Justices could return to the Court
temporarily to fill unexpected vacancies.86 The proposal also has one
interesting feature designed to prevent obstruction of nominees in the Senate.
It provides that, if the Senate fails to act within 120 days of the president’s
nomination, the nominee will be automatically seated.87 This provision
would address a situation like the one that arose in 2016 with President
Obama’s nomination of Judge Garland, although importantly it would not
prevent the Senate from simply holding a vote and voting down any
nominees by the president.
7. Other Proposals
Most proposals for term limits have converged on eighteen-year limits,
and we expect that policymakers would be most likely to select that length
of term if they do adopt term limits. A number of commentators have
proposed terms of different lengths, however, and we will briefly catalogue
them here.
Henry Paul Monaghan has suggested “some fixed and unrenewable
term, such as fifteen or twenty years” for Supreme Court Justices.88 The
problem with a fifteen- or twenty-year term limit, however, is that, with a
85. Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act of 2020, H.R. 8424, 116th Cong.
(2020). Fix the Court endorses this proposal. See First-Ever Measure to End Life Tenure on the
Supreme Court Via Statute, Not Amendment, to Be Introduced, FIX THE CT. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://fix
thecourt.com/2020/09/first-ever-measure-end-life-tenure-supreme-court-via-statute-not-amendmentintroduced [https://perma.cc/9PEV-HTNC].
86. H.R. 8424, § 3.
87. Id.
88. Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202,
1212 (1988).
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nine-member Supreme Court, it would not distribute appointments evenly
among presidents—which is one common goal shared by many term-limits
advocates. This is presumably why the eighteen-year limit has far more
support than either fifteen- or twenty-year terms.
But some think eighteen years is too long. Conservative commentator
Mark Levin has proposed staggered twelve-year term limits, with three
appointments made each presidential term rather than two under the
eighteen-year plan.89 Stephen Carter has proposed staggered nine-year
terms, which would translate into one appointment each year and four each
presidential term.90
And an even shorter term-limits proposal comes from D.C. Circuit
Judge Laurence Silberman. He argues that in order to “make justices think
of themselves as judges,” Supreme Court appointees should serve for only
five years, after which they could sit on the lower courts for life.91 With a
five-year limit, every two-term president would get to replace the entire
membership of the Supreme Court—an outcome we suspect would strike
many observers as undesirable.
C. COMPARING PROPOSALS
There are a number of tradeoffs associated with the design decisions
underpinning different term-limits proposals. In this Section, we will lay out
a framework of possible tradeoffs that will help guide our comparison of the
different proposals. In particular, we are interested in how the different
proposals might affect the composition of the Court in various ways. That
said, we limit our analysis to differences that are possible to assess
empirically through simulations.
We see six distinct ways in which the design choices made by these
proposals may affect the composition of the Court: (1) the Transition
Process for implementing the reform; (2) the Appointment and Tenure of
Justices; (3) the Ideological Composition of the Supreme Court; (4) the
Confirmation Incentives for new Justices; (5) the Profile of Nominees to
the Supreme Court; and (6) the Final Period Problems that could be created.
1. Transition Process
An initial way to assess the tradeoffs associated with different termlimits proposals is how they would handle the transition from the current
89.
(2013).
90.
91.

MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 49–50
Carter, supra note 32.
Symposium, Term Limits for Judges?, 13 J.L. & POL. 669, 687 (1997).
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system of life tenure to a system of term limits. Assuming that staggered
vacancies are the goal, moving to such a system would always take some
time. Proposals have different procedures for how quickly to make the move
to that system, with some waiting a set period of years and others waiting for
an intervening president to be elected. Given these differences, an important
question is how long the full transition is likely to take.
2. Appointments and Tenure
A primary goal of term-limits plans is to regularize appointments across
presidential terms. That said, although this is a primary goal of the various
term-limits proposals, there are tradeoffs that may influence the relationship
between presidential elections and the appointment of Justices. For instance,
plans that would go fully into effect immediately would regularize
appointments more quickly than plans that would not go fully into effect
until after the legacy Justices have died or voluntarily retired. Similarly, the
different approaches that term-limits proposals adopt for addressing
unexpected vacancies through deaths or retirements (or, less likely but still
possible, removal of Justices after impeachment) also influence the
regularity of appointments. One key margin to evaluate different proposals’
design features is the extent to which they ensure that presidents have similar
influence on the composition of the membership of the Court. Moreover, if
a proposal allows presidents at the time of enactment to make more
selections to the Court—or to nominate Justices to the Court that are allowed
to serve life terms—there may be windfalls in terms of the number of Justiceyears that are appointed by a particular president. The transition itself may
result in windfalls to the president in office at the time of enactment.
3. Ideological Composition
Another way to assess the tradeoffs associated with different termlimits proposals is the impact that they may have on the ideological
composition of the Supreme Court. We have discussed how reform could be
designed to make the Court’s membership, and thus presumably its
ideological composition, more closely track the results of presidential
elections. But plans that increase the short-term responsiveness of judicial
appointments to electoral outcomes could also create more swings in
ideology of the Court. These swings between liberal and conservative Courts
could lead to doctrinal instability that might undermine the Court’s
legitimacy over time.92 Those who favor shorter-term democratic control
92. Defenders of life tenure justify the practice using this argument. See Stras & Scott, supra note
19, at 1424 (“Swift legal change and the rapid-fire reversal of controlling precedent undermine the Court’s
legitimacy by creating the appearance that its decisions turn on nothing more than the personnel on the
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would have to consider this potential cost. Relatedly, these changes to the
appointment process may also result in more instances of one party having
large majorities on the Court, which could lead to more extreme swings in
legal doctrine as personnel changed. Moreover, the precise details of the
term-limits plan might result in a Court that is more (or less) ideologically
polarized.
4. Confirmation Incentives
Another important concern is how features of term-limits proposals
may influence confirmation incentives. Although at some points in history
the Senate may have been deferential to the nominees selected by the
president, the political clashes over efforts to confirm replacements for
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg illustrate how the members of the Senate may
be unwilling to acquiesce to any appointments by the opposite party. One
way to evaluate proposals is how likely it is that a proposal will result in
vacancies arising at times that are more likely to produce deadlocks during
the confirmation process that prevent new Justices from being seated on the
Supreme Court.
5. Profile of Nominees
A distinct set of concerns relates to how term limits could affect the
kinds of nominees presidents might select. It is possible that different
features of various plans will impact which individuals are offered, and
accept, nominations to the Supreme Court. For example, the shorter the term
length, the more people will need to be appointed to the Court over time. If
there were a very small supply of the most qualified potential nominees
(which seems quite unlikely), the overall quality of appointees would go
down. Term limits might also affect whether someone is willing to accept a
nomination to the Court because an indefinite term is more desirable. Term
limits may also affect the age of nominees. Shorter terms might make
presidents more willing to select older candidates, while at the same time
could make much younger candidates more palatable to senators.
6. Final Period Problems
A final consideration is whether the existence of term limits that require
a Justice to step down at a specific date would cause them to change their
behavior toward the end of their term. For instance, there is evidence
suggesting that legislators and congressional staffers change their behavior
at the end of their time working on Capitol Hill in ways that will appeal to
Court.”).
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future employers in the lobbying industry.93 Following this logic, one
concern that has been raised with term limits is that the Justices may change
their votes at the end of the term in order to make them more appealing for
future work in industries in private practice, politics, or academia.94 The
concern is thus that having an end date on their tenure could lead Justices to
have less commitment to impartiality or to their responsibility as judges.
III. EVALUATING PROPOSALS
We now turn to evaluating term-limits proposals based on how their
design decisions impact the tradeoffs outlined above. To do so, we run
counterfactual historical simulations that allow us to directly compare the
proposals along key dimensions and, by doing so, identify the features of the
proposals that drive key differences in the composition of the Supreme
Court.
A. METHODS
We use simulations to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with five of the
Supreme Court term-limit proposals we introduced in Section II.B.95
Simulations are a research method used widely in the social sciences.96 They
are used in situations where uncertainty about some event occurring makes
it difficult to assess the likelihood of an outcome.
At the most basic level, these simulations require explicitly stipulating
a set of assumptions, identifying the key variables for which there is
uncertainty, using a computer to randomly generate values for those
variables for which there is uncertainty, calculating the outcome of interest
given the realizations of the random variables, and then repeating that
process many times.97 Through this process, simulations are able to generate
a distribution of possible outcomes given the initial set of assumptions. As a
93. See, e.g., Michael E. Shepherd & Hye Young You, Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and
Revolving Doors in Congress, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 270, 279–82 (2020). See generally ADOLFO
SANTOS, DO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS REWARD THEIR FUTURE EMPLOYERS?: EVALUATING THE
REVOLVING DOOR SYNDROME (2006).
94. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 48.
95. We exclude the Oliver Proposal from this analysis because the UVA Plan made policy choices
along the dimensions relevant to these simulations that mean they produces the same results.
96. See generally THOMAS M. CARSEY & JEFFREY J. HARDEN, MONTE CARLO SIMULATION AND
RESAMPLING METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE (2014).
97. For a more technical explanation of the process, see id. at 6–7 (“[T]he typical Monte Carlo
simulation involves drawing multiple random samples of data from an assumed [Data Generation Process
(DGP)] that describes the unobserved process in the larger population of how a phenomenon of interest
is produced. It is the true or real DGP that scholars are ultimately interested in evaluating. Of course, we
rarely know what the true DGP is in the real world—we just see the sample data it produces. Most of our
research is about trying to uncover the underlying DGP or test predictions that emerge from different
theories about what the DGP looks like.”).
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result, if the initial assumptions are credible, simulations make it possible to
estimate the most likely outcomes and range of possible outcomes for
complex political and social phenomena.
Given these strengths, simulations have been used for a variety of
applications in the empirical legal studies literature. For example,
simulations have been used to study the relative economic importance of
contract terms;98 whether judicial assignments to cases are random;99 the
extent of publication bias in empirical legal scholarship;100 and whether law
schools could improve their academic impact by imposing stricter tenure
standards.101
In the case of Supreme Court term limits, there are two primary sources
of uncertainty that must be accounted for when assessing the tradeoffs of
different proposals. First, even though most variants of term-limits proposals
try to increase the predictability of when vacancies on the Court will occur,
there is still uncertainty because unexpected vacancies—due to death,
incapacitation, resignation, or even removal—will inevitably occur. Second,
there is also uncertainty about which political party (or parties) will control
the executive and legislative branches of government when these
vacancies—whether expected or unexpected—do in fact occur. Simulating
how various term-limits proposals would compare thus requires developing
a way to model these two sources of uncertainty.
Our method for modeling these two sources of uncertainty is to compare
the results that the different term-limits proposals would have produced if
they had been in effect during the post-1937 period. More specifically, we
begin by imagining that each of the different reform proposals had been
adopted in 1937. We then assume that the control of the presidency and the
Senate evolved in exactly the way that it actually did. For instance, we
assume that Dwight D. Eisenhower is always president from January 1953
to January 1961, that the Republican Party always controlled the Senate from
1953 to 1955, and that Democrats always controlled the Senate from 1955
through 1961. To assess whether the choice of “starting” in 1937 changes
things, we then further simulate what would have happened if the term-limits
proposals had been adopted in 1938, 1939, and so on, to 1970. We then allow
98. See Kate Litvak, Monte Carlo Simulation of Contractual Provisions: An Application to Default
Provisions in Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1495 (2013).
99. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2015); see also David S. Abrams, Marianne
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347
(2012).
100. See Daniel E. Ho, Foreword: Conference Bias, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 603 (2013).
101. Adam Chilton, Jonathan Masur & Kyle Rozema, Rethinking Law School Tenure Standards,
50 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2021).
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each simulation to run for fifty years. This is to ensure that each simulation
runs for the same number of years. As a result, we simulate the start year of
term limits beginning in every year between 1937 and 1970, and our
simulations thus include every year between 1937 and 2020. Through this
approach, our results are not driven entirely by the specific events in the
historical record that would be associated with using a single start date.
For each simulation, we assume that vacancies that emerge on the
Supreme Court would be filled in the way stipulated by the express terms of
a given plan. This includes taking a plan’s rollout process on its own terms.
For instance, for the UVA Plan, this means that, starting in the first year of
enactment, all appointments to the Supreme Court are for eighteen years. In
contrast, for the Renewal Act, this means that new appointments could serve
for longer than eighteen-year terms until the last remaining Justice that was
active at the time of the plan’s enactment leaves the Court.
For these simulations, we assume that all the actual Justices that were
on the Court in the year the plan was hypothetically enacted either served
until they actually left the Court or until the specific requirements of a given
term-limits plan would have required them to be removed. For example,
Justice Felix Frankfurter served on the Supreme Court from 1939 to 1962.
For our simulations that start in 1937, Justice Frankfurter would not be a
member of the Court. But for a simulation that starts in 1940, Justice
Frankfurter would be a legacy member of the Supreme Court until the
specific terms of a given plan required him to be replaced. But if the specifics
of a given term-limits plan allowed legacy Justices to serve until they either
voluntarily left the Court or died, our simulations would assume that Justice
Frankfurter served until 1962. In other words, our simulations take the initial
Justices at the time a plan is started as a given based on the actual Justices
that served on the Supreme Court; for those actual Justices, when applicable,
we use the actual date they left the Court.
For the hypothetical Justices that we simulate joining the Court,
however, we must model the uncertainty in how long they would serve on
the Court. This is because it is unrealistic to assume that all the Justices
would serve full eighteen-year terms. We do this also to investigate a key
point of difference among the various term-limit proposals: how they fill
unexpected vacancies.
Simulating this uncertainty, however, requires making assumptions
about the rate that Justices would be likely to leave the Court. One approach
to estimate unexpected vacancies would be to use actuarial tables to assess
the probability that a Justice would die in a given year, conditional on their
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age.102 Although this approach offers the best way to estimate the probability
that an average American would die in a given year conditional on their age,
the people appointed to the Supreme Court are presumably not average along
a range of relevant dimensions. Importantly, the Justices are extremely
highly educated, wealthier than the general population, and have access to
excellent medical care. Moreover, a president is unlikely to appoint anyone
to the Supreme Court when there is evidence that they are not of sound health
at the time of their appointment. As a result, the probability that a sixty-yearold Supreme Court Justice will live to see their seventieth birthday is
probably higher than it is for the average sixty-year-old American.
Given this concern, instead of relying on actuarial tables, we generate
estimates of the probability that the Justices would die in a given year
conditional on their age based on the actual mortality rates of a similar
population: the universe of federal judges. Using data from the Federal
Judicial Center, we calculate the probability that a Justice of a given age in
a given decade would die each year.103 Figure 6 plots these probabilities by
decade and shows that federal judges from any decade who are between fiftyfive and seventy-five years old have roughly the same chance of dying in
that year as an average American of the same age in 2017. Because life
expectancies have increased over time, this suggests that judges have been
less likely to die overall than average Americans. Moreover, a considerable
difference opens up between roughly age eighty and ninety-five, in which
federal judges are noticeably less likely to die than an average American of
comparable age.
We simulate unexpected vacancies for the Supreme Court using the
probabilities reported in Figure 6. Specifically, we assume that Justices are
fifty-five years old when they are appointed to the Supreme Court. We make
this assumption because it is similar to the actual average age of Justices
appointed across history of roughly 53.2,104 and because it is consistent with
assumptions made in the term-limits literature, such as the assumption made
by Bailey and Yoon that Justices would be fifty-five years old at the time of
appointment.105 We also think it is reasonable to assume that, if anything, the
average age of appointment would go up slightly under a term-limits plan
since there would be nothing gained by appointing a younger candidate.
102. See, e.g., Bailey & Yoon, supra note 12, at 302 (“We base the probability of dying from the
2005 US life tables . . . .”).
103. To do so, we estimate a spline and interact the spline with the decade that the judge was first
appointed. After regressing whether a judge has died in a given year after being appointed, we recover
the conditional probabilities of death from the predicted values from the regression coefficients.
104. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 800.
105. Bailey & Yoon, supra note 12, at 302.
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FIGURE 6. Mortality Rates of Federal Judges by Decade

To simulate unexpected vacancies for each Justice-year we randomly
generate a number between zero and one. If that random number is less than
the probability of death we generated based on the life expectancy of federal
judges, we assume that the hypothetical Justice has unexpectedly left the
Court and thus needs to be replaced. We then replaced the Justice using the
terms stipulated by a given proposal. In this way, our simulations are able to
account for the uncertainty of when unexpected vacancies are likely to
emerge at the Supreme Court. It is worth noting that this approach in some
ways undercounts vacancies and in other ways may overcount unexpected
vacancies. It may undercount them because we do not attempt to estimate
the possibility of impeachment or resignations, and it may overcount them
because Supreme Court Justices may be less likely to die during an eighteenyear period than an average federal judge because their medical records
likely face greater scrutiny prior to appointment. Our hope is that these two
forces balance out and produce a reasonable estimate of the number of
unexpected vacancies before the end of term limits.
There are three advantages to assessing the impact of term-limits
proposals in this way—that is, by evaluating how they would have
performed historically if implemented in different years while also
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introducing random vacancies. First, simulating how the proposals would
perform historically reduces the need to make strong assumptions about what
will happen in the future. As previously noted, it takes decades for various
term-limits proposals to go fully into effect. As a result, any attempt to
empirically evaluate them needs to adopt a strategy that estimates their effect
over a long period. We thus believe that it is more defensible to base our
assessments on how they would have performed historically instead of trying
to adopt a strategy to model what the outcomes of presidential elections are
likely to be from 2020 to 2100. Second, simulating how the proposals would
perform historically makes it possible to compare each proposal against a
clear and observable counterfactual: what actually happened with the
membership of the Supreme Court in the absence of term limits. Without this
historical comparison, we would not only need to make assumptions about
what would happen with elections in the future, but we would also have to
make assumptions about what would happen to the composition of the
Supreme Court over time in the absence of term-limit reform. Third,
simulating these proposals being enacted in many different years makes it
possible to assess how robust the plans are to various possible political
scenarios. For instance, some simulations begin during large periods of rule
by a single party, but other simulations begin during periods of divided
government or frequent transitions of power. Varying the year of adoption
allows for us to account for various political scenarios.
Of course, our approach does not entirely eliminate the need to make
strong assumptions. Most notably, by assuming that political control remains
the same as is observed historically, we are implicitly assuming that changes
to the rules governing confirmation and tenure on the Supreme Court would
not produce changes in electoral outcomes to the presidency and Senate. This
is, of course, unlikely to be strictly true. To find an example of how
differences in the composition of the Supreme Court could change political
outcomes, we have to look no further than Bush v. Gore, where the Justices
directly intervened in a disputed election.106 Even outside such examples, the
Court can be an issue in presidential elections. Some argue that the vacancy
created by Justice Scalia’s death is partly responsible for Donald Trump’s
victory in 2016.107 Whether term limits would produce the same election
dynamics is unknown.
An alternative to comparing how various plans would have behaved
106. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
107. Philip Bump, A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court Picks — and
It Paid Off, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018, 12:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/
2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supreme-court-picks-and-it-paid-off [https:
//perma.cc/3YF7-LBKV].
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given the historical record would be to fully simulate the entire political
process for a period of time going into the future. For example, Bailey and
Yoon estimate the impact of strategic retirements and potential term limits
on the composition of the Supreme Court by simulating elections into the
future.108 Specifically, they assume that elections happen every four years
going forward for sixty years into the future and that each party has an equal
chance of winning the presidency.109 Each of their simulations thus creates a
different potential future of electoral outcomes. Although this is a perfectly
defensible way to simulate the effect of term-limits proposals, we elected to
not use it for our application. This is because our goal is to compare multiple
different term-limits proposals against each other and against the status quo
of not having term limits. Comparing the performance of plans against the
historical record gives us a clear counterfactual: the actual membership of
the Supreme Court from 1937 to 2020.
B. RESULTS
1. Transition Process
We begin by examining the possible transition process from the current
system of life tenure to one of term-limited tenure. We specifically assess
the average length of the enactment period across different proposals.
Proposals vary significantly in terms of how they handle the rollout of
term limits. Those that do not allow the Justices serving on the Supreme
Court at the time of enactment to retain their life tenure allow for a fairly
quick transition, whereas those that allow the legacy Justices to retain life
tenure can take longer to become fully effective (that is, have a full slate of
Justices serving staggered eighteen-year terms). The result is that there can
be considerable differences in how long it would take for the effects of a plan
to be fully realized.
More specifically, for proposals that would not allow the current
Justices to serve for life—for instance, the UVA Plan—the length of
enactment has a definite end: sixteen years following the initial year that the
first Justice is appointed under the new system.110 This is because these
proposals immediately begin to replace existing Justices on a predictable
schedule. It is possible that this process may take less than sixteen years—
for instance, if some of the sitting Justices die while this transition process is
108. See Bailey & Yoon, supra note 12, at 303.
109. Id.
110. For example, if the first Justice was appointed in 2001, the ninth Justice would be appointed
in 2017 (the schedule would specifically be: second in 2003, third in 2005, fourth in 2007, fifth in 2009,
sixth in 2011, seventh in 2013, eighth in 2016, and ninth in 2017).
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underway—but it would not take longer. For proposals that allow for some
continued role for the legacy Justices, however, the enactment will not be
complete until all the current Justices leave the Court either through death,
retirement, or removal.
To assess the enactment period for these proposals, we estimate the
number of years that it takes for the term-limits proposals to become fully in
effect by simulating how long it would take until all Justices on the Court
were appointed to a term-limited term. These simulations follow the
approach described in Section III.A above, which allows for the possibility
of unexpected deaths using the federal-judge-based estimates from Figure 6.
FIGURE 7. Simulated Number of Years from Enactment Until Every Sitting
Justice Is Serving an Eighteen-Year Term by Proposal

Figure 7 reports the results of these simulations. The figure is a lettervalue plot, which reports the distributions of results across the simulations
for each proposal. The distributions are broken down by decile, but the top
decile (the ninetieth to ninety-fifth percentile and the ninety-fifth to ninetyninth percentile) and bottom decile (the tenth to fifth percentile and the fifth
to first percentile) are broken into two groups. Deciles with the same
values—for instance, if the fortieth, fiftieth, and sixtieth percentiles have the

42

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1

same value of fourteen years—appear as a single area representing the
middle-most decile.
The simulation results reported in Figure 7 reveal that the UVA Plan is
always fully in effect within sixteen years after the first Justice is appointed,
but on average it would be fully enacted within 10.6 years (this is due to
deaths by legacy Justices that would accelerate appointments of new Justices
that are term-limited).
The Khanna Bill and the Justices on Deck proposal both produce the
same distribution of results. This is because they immediately call for the
appointment of Justices that are term-limited while also allowing for legacy
Justices to remain until they finish their life tenure. As a result, the effects of
these plans would not be fully realized until the final legacy Justice leaves
the Court—which, on average across our simulations, is a period of 34.6
years.
The longest enactment period is the Northwestern Plan. The complete
enactment of this plan would take 52.4 years on average and, in some
simulations, takes as long as sixty-nine years. This lengthy enactment time
is due to the fact that some of the appointments on the initial schedule are
skipped depending on how long the legacy Justices serve. This also causes
the distribution of the number of years of the initial appointments during the
transition to vary considerably.
The second longest enactment period is the Renewal Act, which has an
average transition period of 45.4 years. This lengthy enactment time is due
to the fact that the eighteen-year rollout period does not start until all of the
Justices who still enjoy life tenure leave the Court. This means that the
enactment period is simply the average number of years that a Justice sitting
in a given year will remain on the bench plus sixteen years. For example, if
the plan was enacted in 2020, the eighteen-year appointments would not start
until the last current Justice leaves the Court, and the rollout period would
then take sixteen additional years.
2. Appointments and Tenure
A significant appeal of term limits is that they would regularize the
timing of appointments, thus guaranteeing that the composition of the Court
would bear a closer relationship to how long the two major political parties
controlled the presidency and, to a lesser extent, the Senate. Indeed, all termlimits proposals that design the term length so that the same number of
appointments are made each presidential term should accomplish this goal
similarly well. Differences between such proposals emerge in two areas.
First, the length of the transition and exactly how it is implemented can delay
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the reform’s ability to regularize appointments, which can result in one party
having disproportionate control over the Court for a longer period. Second,
how the system handles unexpected vacancies can also distinguish proposals
because these shocks could further distort one party’s representational
advantage.
We assess how well each proposal would do at regularizing
appointments in two ways. First, we examine the average number of Justiceyears that the proposals would produce per presidential term. Second, we
explore whether any of the proposals would create “enactment windfalls” in
which the presidents at the time of the transition to term limits are able to
appoint Justices to the Supreme Court that serve for more Justice-years.
Average Justice-Years. We first estimate the number of Justice-years
per presidential term for all presidencies starting in the enactment year. Like
with the results in Figure 7, these simulations vary the year of
implementation and introduce random vacancies based on the probability of
a federal judge’s death using the data in Figure 6. Across all presidential
terms and all simulations, we then count the number of Justice-years per
presidential term and plot the distribution for each of the proposals.
FIGURE 8. Number of Justice-Years by Presidential Term by Proposal
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Figure 8 reports the results of these simulations. The black line in Figure
8 is at thirty-six Justice-years, which is the number each president would be
entitled to appoint per term if she were able to appoint two Justices that
served for eighteen years.111 The dashed line at thirty-four years is the
historical status quo: the average number of Justice-years that were actually
appointed per presidential term from 1937 to 2020.112
The results in Figure 8 reveal that four of the plans—the UVA Plan,
Northwestern Plan, Renewal Act, and the Khanna Bill—result in a median
of thirty-six Justice-years per presidential term. The Justices on Deck
proposal has a median of twenty-nine Justice-years per presidential term.
This is due to the fact that the Justices on Deck plan requires judges to wait
“on deck” during the implementation period until legacy Justices who were
active when the plan was enacted leave the Court. The result is that many
Justices in the first several decades of the plan serve less than full eighteenyear terms (which, in turn, translates into fewer than thirty-six Justice-years
per president).113
The results in Figure 8 also reveal considerable variation in the number
of Justice-years that each president is likely to appoint. The Khanna Bill and
the Justices on Deck proposal never result in more than forty Justice-years
per presidential term. In contrast, the UVA Plan, Northwestern Plan, and
Renewal Act proposals all result in considerably more variation. Most
notably, the ninety-fifth percentile for the Renewal Act is an average of
seventy-two Justice-years per president. This result is driven by the fact that
the Renewal Act not only allows the Justices who are serving at the time of
enactment to complete their term, but also allows any Justice appointed
between enactment and the departure of the last legacy Justice to serve for
longer terms.
The results in Figure 8 thus reveal that the design choices associated
with different term-limits proposals are likely to produce considerable
variance in the expected number of Justice-years per presidential term.
However, it is important to acknowledge that, because one of the primary
differences between the proposals driving these results is how they handle
the transition from the current system of life tenure to one of term limits, the
differences across proposals would naturally decrease over enough time as
they become fully implemented.
111. With a nine-Justice Court, and assuming vacancies are filled in the same year as they arise, the
average number of Justice-years should always be thirty-six, regardless of whether the system uses term
limits of any length or life tenure. What matters is not the average but the variance—do all presidents get
close to thirty-six Justice-years, or do some get many more while others get far fewer?
112. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying discussion.
113. See infra Figure 9 for another discussion of this issue.
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Enactment Windfalls. As explained above, one of the explicit goals of
most term-limits proposals is to ensure a more consistent relationship
between electoral outcomes and influence over the composition at the
Supreme Court. But as the results in Figure 8 reveal, even plans designed to
accomplish that goal can still produce inequalities in the number of Justiceyears appointed by presidential term. However, the analysis in Figure 8
looked at the inequality in Justice-years across all presidential terms. By
averaging across terms, that analysis obscured the possibility that the
transition to a system of term limits may result in a windfall of influence for
the presidents elected closer to the time of enactment. Or, put another way,
there may be more (or less) seats to fill during the early years when the plan
is transitioning in the new term-limited Justices.
To assess this empirically, we calculate the number of Justice-years by
the presidential terms after the enactment period. Specifically, we indexed
our results from Figure 8 by event time, where event time is the presidential
term when the simulation starts, event time 1 is the first full presidential term
after we simulate the beginning of the plan, and so on. We then calculate the
average number of Justice-years for each event time for a given proposal.
FIGURE 9. Average Number of Justice-Years by Presidential Terms from
Enactment by Proposal
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Figure 9 reports the results of this analysis. The results suggest that
several of the plans are designed in a way that creates a windfall for the
president at the time of enactment. Under the Renewal Act, Justices
appointed at the time of enactment would serve an average of 50.8 Justiceyears, and Justices appointed during the following presidential term would
serve an average of 42.6 Justice-years. Similarly, the UVA Plan would allow
Justices appointed at the time of enactment to serve an average of 46.9
Justice-years, and the Northwestern Plan would allow them to serve an
average of 47.8 Justice-years. For all three plans, this number of Justiceyears is noticeably larger than for the next several presidents. The Khanna
Bill, in contrast, produces near identical averages across these initial
presidential terms: roughly thirty-three Justice-years per president. The
Justices on Deck proposal, however, produces an average of roughly twentythree Justice-years per president across these presidential terms. This is
because the Justices on Deck plan requires Justices appointed after the plan
is passed to wait “on deck” until spots open up as the legacy Justices leave
the Court. If it takes eight years for a spot to open up for a newly appointed
Justice to join the voting members of the Court, that Justice would only serve
for ten years (the remainder of their eighteen years). As a result, the initial
presidents would get fewer than the expected thirty-six Justice-years (that is,
two eighteen-year terms) from their appointments.
3. Ideological Composition
We next assess the impact that term limits proposals are likely to have
on the ideological balance of the Supreme Court. We do so in four ways.
First, we examine how many times these plans would lead to changes in the
identity of the Justice who is the ideological median of the Court. Second,
we assess the extent to which different plans may lead to extreme ideological
imbalance on the Court. Third, we explore whether these ideological changes
would translate into more years in which one party controls a majority of the
Supreme Court as well as both of the political branches. Fourth, we estimate
the impact that term-limits proposals would have on ideological polarization
on the Court.
Ideological Stability. One possible drawback of moving to a system of
term limits is that life tenure may encourage ideological stability. This is for
several reasons. First, we might expect the Court to be more ideologically
stable when Justices serve for longer periods resulting in less turnover.
Second, life tenure creates incentives for strategic retirements, which help
maintain ideological stability. As a result, the ideological makeup of the
Court is only likely to change either when a Justice’s ideology drifts
substantially or when deaths occur and the White House is controlled by the
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opposite party.
We measure the impact of term-limits reforms on how often the Court
“flips” between conservative and liberal majorities. If the Court flips more
frequently under a term-limits proposal than under the current system, such
flipping may be desirable—as discussed already, we might want the Court
to better reflect the actual results of presidential elections. At the same time,
however, if the Court flips frequently under a term-limits proposal, it could
be undesirable, as it could lead to significant legal uncertainty.
To simulate how ideologically stable the Court would be under different
term-limits plans, we assume that Supreme Court Justices share the
ideological leanings of the president that appointed them. That is, we assume
that Justices appointed by Democrats are liberal and Justices appointed by
Republicans are conservative and, thus, the appointments by each party
contribute to the number of Justices in the conservative or liberal voting
blocs for purposes of identifying the median Justice.114 Under this
assumption, Figure 10 assesses how often the Court would flip from having
a liberal majority to having a conservative majority, or vice versa. For each
twenty-year period, we count the average number of times that the identity
of the Court’s median would have flipped. The dotted line in Figure 10
reports the actual number of times the Court median flipped every twenty
years between 1937 and 2020: 0.9.
114. Although we adopt this assumption because it has been true on average, it is important to
acknowledge that there have, of course, been exceptions. For instance, Justices Souter and Stevens were
both appointed by Republican presidents but ended their careers as reliable members of the Court’s liberal
wing. That said, assuming that presidents will typically appoint Justices that share their ideological
leanings is standard in the academic literature.
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FIGURE 10. Number of Times the Court Median Flips Every Twenty Years
by Proposal

The results in Figure 10 reveal that, of the five proposals we evaluate,
four of the proposals tend to produce fewer flips in ideology than what
actually occurred from 1937 to 2020. Specifically, the Northwestern Plan,
Renewal Act, the Justices on Deck proposal, and the Khanna Bill all had
median flips less than 0.9. The UVA Plan, on the other hand, produced 1.6
flips per twenty years on average—which is a result of that plan having a
much shorter transition period than the others. This suggests that many plans
may produce Supreme Courts that are more ideologically stable than the
status-quo, but that this is not necessarily the case for all possible plans.
Extreme Imbalance. A separate consideration is whether term-limits
proposals are likely to produce extreme ideological imbalance. For this
exercise, we define extreme imbalance as Justices appointed by presidents
of the same party occupying seventy-five percent or more of seats on the
Court.115 Extreme imbalance may be a concern because periods with
115. We use this seventy-five percent threshold, instead of simply counting periods of seven or more
seats, because it is possible that there may not be exactly nine Justices on the Court at certain times. For
instance, the Supreme Court only had eight members for more than a year following Justice Scalia’s death
in 2016.
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ideological imbalance may be more likely to produce judicial decisions out
of step with the preferences of the public, which, in turn, may weaken the
legitimacy of the Court.
To assess this possibility, Figure 11 reports results counting the share
of years with extreme ideological imbalance from our simulations. In periods
where there are nine Justices serving on the Court, this would mean that one
party controlled seven or more seats. To provide a comparison, the dotted
line in Figure 11 reports the relevant historical benchmark: the share of years
that actually had extreme party imbalance using this definition in the eightyfour years from 1937 to 2020, which was 59.5%.
FIGURE 11. Share of Years with Extreme Party Imbalance by Proposal

The results in Figure 11 reveal that all five plans result in less party
imbalance than what actually occurred from 1937 to 2020. The reason is
simply that all plans decrease the possibility of extreme swings in the
appointment of Justices by presidential term by reducing, if not removing,
the roles of unexpected vacancies and strategic retirement in shaping the
Supreme Court. Instead, the median share of years with extreme party
imbalance ranged from 27.5% under the Khanna Bill to 41.2% under the
Justices on Deck proposal.
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Years of Divided Government. The Constitution was designed to
separate governmental power along functional lines among distinct branches
of government while also giving each branch some power to serve as a check
on actions by other branches. The president participates in legislation using
the veto, and so on. In the words of Madison, with these institutional designs,
“ambition” will “be made to counteract ambition.”116
In recent years, however, scholars have increasingly recognized that
this Madisonian separation of powers may function in a manner similar to
how it was intended only where different branches of government are
controlled by different political parties—an insight summarized as the
“separation of parties.”117 This is because when Congress and the Presidency
share common interests—such as when both are controlled by the same
political party—separating power along functional lines may not create
much institutional oversight. But such oversight may be more likely to occur
where government is divided—that is, where different parties control the
branches of government.
For this reason, we might want to know how often a majority of the
Court will be appointments by a political party that also controls the
corresponding political branches. Compared to the current system of life
tenure, there are reasons to think that term limits might increase the
prevalence of undivided control of government. This is because the shorter
tenures and more regular appointments may increase the connection between
the composition of the Court and current political trends. By so doing, it may
result in a higher share of years in which the branches of the federal
government are controlled by the same party.
To assess this, we calculate the share of years with an undivided federal
government for each simulated enactment year and recover a distribution of
shares for the proposal across all enactment years. We define undivided
government as when Congress, the presidency, and the majority of the
Supreme Court are all controlled by the same political party. For example,
for proposal x being enacted in year t, we calculate the share of years from t
to 2020 with an undivided government. In Figure 12, we again included a
dotted line to show the relevant historical benchmark, in this case, the actual
share of years with undivided government from 1937 to 2020, which is 32.1
years.
116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006).
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FIGURE 12. Share of Years with Undivided Control of All Three Branches of
the Federal Government by Proposal

Figure 12 reports the share of years of undivided government. For all
five plans, the median share of years with undivided government is lower
than the actual share of years with undivided government during our sample
(32.1 years). For these simulations, the median share of years when the same
party controlled Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court majority
was roughly 25.2 years. This ranged from 23.5 years under the UVA Plan,
Northwestern Plan, and Renewal Act, to 29.4 years under the Justices on
Deck proposal. In other words, imposing term limits would likely reduce the
share of years with a single party controlling all three branches of the federal
government.
Ideological Polarization. A separate consideration is whether a given
plan is more likely to result in the appointment of Justices who are
ideologically extreme. Under the current system, Supreme Court vacancies
can occur at random times due to deaths and health-related retirements and
at nonrandom times due to strategic retirements. The current system enables
Justices to behave strategically by retiring when both the Presidency and the
Senate are controlled by the party with whom they identify. In fact, eight of
the last nine Justices confirmed to the Court—that is, every Justice except
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for Justice Amy Coney Barrett—was nominated and confirmed during the
first two years of a presidential term, when both the presidency and the
Senate were controlled by the same party.118 The term-limits reforms,
however, are typically designed to distribute Supreme Court appointments
evenly between the first and second halves of each presidential term—such
as by providing one appointment each odd-numbered year.
This matters because of the Senate’s role in the confirmation process.
The party holding the presidency usually loses ground in the Senate in
midterm elections.119 For that reason, we might expect Justices selected
during presidents’ first two years in office to be, on average, more
ideologically extreme than those selected during the second half of any given
presidential term. Thus, we might expect a term-limits proposal that staggers
vacancies in two-year intervals to produce a less ideologically polarized
Court than the current system, in which vacancies may occur more frequently
during the first half of a presidential term.
One way to assess this kind of polarization is by the number of Justices
who were confirmed when the Senate majority and the president are of the
same party. The benefit of using this approach to measure polarization is that
it only requires a simple assumption that presidents will appoint more
extreme candidates when their party controls the Senate. We believe this is
a reasonable assumption because within any of the four combinations of
president and Senate party-control—Republican president and Republican
majority Senate, Republican president and Democratic majority Senate,
Democratic president and Republican majority Senate, and Democratic
president and Democratic majority Senate—the expected ideology of a judge
is likely to differ. For example, a Republican president with a Republican
majority Senate is likely to result in a Justice that is to the ideological right
of a Justice appointed by a Republican president and confirmed by a
Democratic majority Senate.
One drawback, however, is that this binary way of assessing the
ideological polarization of Justices may oversimplify how the relationship
between the president and Senate translates into the actual ideology of
Justices that would be appointed.120 There have been many theoretical
118. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were confirmed during President Bill Clinton’s first two years,
when the Senate was controlled by Democrats. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were confirmed
during the first two years of President George W. Bush’s second term, when the Senate was controlled
by Republicans. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan were confirmed during the first two years of President
Obama’s first term, when the Senate was controlled by Democrats. And Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
were confirmed during the first two years of President Donald Trump’s presidency, when the Senate was
controlled by Republicans.
119. See Grofman et al., supra note 75.
120. For example, although it is likely that Justices appointed under a unified presidency and Senate
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models proposed to explain this exact dynamic, most of which are known as
move-the-median models.121 These models try to produce more exact
estimates of what kind of Justice would be appointed by a president of a
given ideology and Senate of a given ideology. However, the best evidence
suggests that there is little empirical support for these more complex
models.122 As a result, we follow prior research and simply assume that
Justices are more likely to be ideologically extreme if they were appointed
by presidents and Senates of the same party.123
Based on the assumption that Justices confirmed when the same party
controls the Senate and presidency are more likely to be ideologically
extreme, Figure 13 assesses polarization across the proposals by reporting
the distribution of Justices on the Court in a given year who were confirmed
when the Senate majority and the president are of the same party. The idea
is that for a given year—say 1980—we count whether the Justices that were
on the Supreme Court in that simulation had been appointed when the
president and Senate majority were either both Democrats or both
Republicans. For instance, if five of the nine Justices had been appointed in
those years, the share would be fifty-five percent. If the same nine Justices
were still on the Court in 1981, the share would still be fifty-five percent for
the year. The distribution shown in Figure 13 is that share across all years
and all simulations.124 For Figure 13, the dotted line reports the historical
benchmark, which is the share of Justices that were actually confirmed
between 1937 and 2020 when the Senate was controlled by same party as the
president, which was 62.7% of Justices.
will tend to be more ideologically extreme than Justices appointed when the presidency and the Senate
are controlled by different parties, this is not guaranteed.
121. See generally Keith Krehbiel, Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51
AM. J. POL. SCI. 231 (2007); Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court
Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999); David
Cottrell, Charles R. Shipan & Richard J. Anderson, The Power to Appoint: Presidential Nominations and
Change on the Supreme Court, 81 J. POL. 1057 (2019); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Jeffrey R. Lax, Michael
Malecki & Justin H. Phillips, Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan Representation in Supreme
Court Confirmation Politics, 77 J. POL. 787 (2015); Charles M. Cameron & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Are
Supreme Court Nominations a Move-the-Median Game?, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 778 (2016).
122. See generally Cameron & Kastellec, supra note 121.
123. See, e.g., Bailey & Yoon, supra note 12.
124. As noted above in Section III.A, we simulated each year multiple times.
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FIGURE 13. Share of Justices on the Court in a Given Year Appointed When
the Senate and Presidency Were Controlled by the Same Party by Proposal

The results in Figure 13 show that the median share of Justices
appointed in a year when the Senate and presidency were controlled by the
same party would be forty-four percent (which translates to four out of nine
Justices) for the Northwestern Plan, fifty-five percent for the UVA Plan and
the Renewal Act, sixty percent for the Khanna Bill, and sixty-six percent for
the Justices on Deck plan. These results suggest that, on average, adopting
term limits could reduce the share of years in which Justices were appointed
when the Senate and presidency were controlled by the same party (perhaps
by reducing the role of strategic retirement), but that such circumstances
would still occur for a large share of appointments.
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4. Confirmation Incentives
Because vacancies can interfere with the Court’s decision-making,125 it
would be preferable if term-limits reforms could avoid creating situations
that are likely to leave seats on the Court open for a significant length of
time. Although there may be several factors that increase the likelihood of
lengthy vacancies, the recent process of replacing Justice Scalia highlights
two factors that may be particularly relevant. First, whether the Senate is
controlled by the opposing party to the president is likely a decisive factor in
whether there will be a lengthy vacancy. If the Senate is controlled by the
same party as the president, it is unlikely that the president and Senate
majority would be unable to reach a compromise. But if the Senate is
controlled by the opposing party, prolonged vacancies are far more likely.
Second, the year of the presidential term when a Supreme Court seat
becomes vacant may influence whether the seat is promptly filled. As the
Garland affair illustrates, the Senate may become more able, or more willing,
to block nominees to vacancies arising later in a presidential term.
To assess whether these conditions are more likely to emerge with some
term-limits plans than others, we break out the results of our simulations by
when vacancies occurred based on the year of the presidential term (that is,
the first, second, third, or fourth year) and whether the opposing party
controlled the Senate. To do so, we take the total number of appointments
that occur for a given plan and report the share of the total vacancies that
occurred during divided government by year.
Figure 14 reports the results of this analysis. For all five plans, the
largest share of vacancies in divided government occurred in the first year of
presidential terms. Two of the plans—the Justices on Deck plan and the
Khanna Bill—only produce vacancies during the first and third years of
presidential terms. This is because these plans fill unexpected vacancies by
allowing Justices that have served longer than their eighteen-year terms to
return to active service. By doing so, they avoid scenarios in which a Justice
would have to be confirmed during the final year of a presidency. These
periods, if the Senate is controlled by the opposing party, are arguably the
125. For example, if the Court has only eight Justices, as it did for more than a year after Justice
Scalia’s death in 2016, it may be unable to reach decisions in cases in which the Justices are evenly
divided. During the vacancy left by Justice Scalia, the Court was unable to resolve several important
disputes due to the inability to break ties on the Court. The highest profile case in which this occurred
was United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam), which affirmed—by an evenly divided
court—a lower court ruling enjoining President Obama’s Deferred Action for the Parents of Americans
immigration program. That said, it is worth noting that one scholar has argued that a Court with an even
number of members may be preferable. See generally Eric J. Segall, Eight Justices Are Enough: A
Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018) (arguing in favor of
an eight-member Court evenly divided on ideological grounds).
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time where the Senate may be most likely to block a confirmation.
FIGURE 14. Share of Appointments During Divided Government by Year of
Presidential Term

Three of the plans, however, did produce a considerable number of
vacancies when the Senate is controlled by the opposing party in the final
year of presidential terms. Notably, the UVA Plan produced 10.5% of
vacancies in the fourth year of presidential terms when the Senate is
controlled by the opposing party, the Renewal Act produced 5.1%, and the
Northwestern Plan produced 7.0%.
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5. Profile of Nominees
There are several ways that term-limits proposals may alter the profile
of the Justices nominated to the Supreme Court.126 This Section evaluates
two ways this may occur: (1) diluting the quality of Justices by increasing
the number of Justices appointed to the Court over time and (2) changing the
age profile of Justices appointed to the Court.
Diluting the Quality of Nominees. It is possible that a term-limits
system could affect the quality of Supreme Court nominees. One reason this
may occur is that a term-limits system would require more frequent
appointments—and thus more appointments total. This might suggest that
the quality of nominees could decrease, depending on the depth of the pool
of lawyers that satisfy the relevant criteria.
Of course, for any viable term-limits plan, there are undoubtedly many
more lawyers across the country who are qualified nominees than would be
realistically required. However, the pool of available nominees may be much
smaller if the president is fixed on appointing Justices that: (1) are already
serving in high-level legal positions (for example, federal district or circuit
courts, state supreme courts, or the Office of Solicitor General); (2) are
within a narrow age band; and (3) fit the ideological and demographic
preferences the president has for the appointment. The pool of potential
Justices that satisfy these criteria may be relatively small. As a result, termlimits plans that increase the number of nominees that are required over time
could reduce the number of viable Supreme Court nominees and thus could
cause presidents to compromise on some of their preferred criteria.
126. In Section III.B.2 above, we considered how term limits proposals may alter the ideological
profile of the Justices appointed to the Supreme Court.
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FIGURE 15. Distribution of the Number of Nominees Required for Every
Twenty-Year Period By Proposal

To assess this possibility, we calculated the number of nominees that
would be required by each plan across our simulations. Figure 15 specifically
reports the distribution of nominees that would be required in a twenty-year
period by plan. Figure 15 also plots, via a dotted line, the pertinent historical
benchmark, or the number of nominees every twenty years from 1937 to
2020, which was 9.4 nominees every twenty years on average.
The results in Figure 15 reveal noticeable differences across proposals
in the number of nominees that would be required for every twenty-year
period. For instance, the UVA Plan would require roughly eleven Justices
every twenty years. This is because, when unexpected vacancies occur, the
UVA Plan does not allow for senior Justices to rejoin the Court. Instead, it
provides for interim appointments of justices who would serve the remainder
of the term but would not be eligible for reappointment. The Justices on Deck
and Khanna Bill proposals require ten Justices on average every twenty years
due to the fact that unexpected vacancies are typically filled by adding a
senior Justice back to the Court. In contrast, the Renewal Act and
Northwestern Plan provide for considerably more variation in the number of
Justices that would be required. This is because they provide for new
appointments when existing Justices die or voluntarily leave the Court,
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implying that random deaths result in greater variability. However, all of the
plans would require a number of nominees that most would agree would not
exhaust the pool of qualified individuals—for example, there are currently
179 judgeships on the U.S. courts of appeals (the most common source for
Supreme Court nominees).
Age of Nominees. It is also possible that term limits may alter the age
profile of nominees. For instance, term limits may lead to older nominees on
average by decreasing the value of appointing someone with the highest
possible longevity (and, therefore, the incentive to appoint someone young).
Alternatively, term limits may lead to younger nominees on average by
decreasing objections to young nominees because Senators would not worry
that they would stay on the Court for decades.127 Given that either of these
dynamics could play out, we do not make strong predictions about how termlimits proposals could change the age profile of nominees. It is possible,
however, to assess the maximum age nominees could be while still
maintaining a high probability that they would complete a full eighteen-year
term.
To explore how term limits may influence the age of nominees, Figure
16 reports the results of simulations that estimate how many Justices would
be eligible to serve on the Supreme Court assuming that a term-limits
proposal had been fully implemented and all Justices had been appointed at
the same age. For example, if an eighteen-year term-limits proposal were
fully implemented and every president had appointed Justices at fifty years
old, our simulations suggest that in equilibrium the first and ninety-ninth
percentiles for the number of Justices alive in any given year are fourteen
and twenty-three. Moreover, the simulations suggest that there would be
more than nine eligible Justices in at least ninety-nine percent of years for
Justices who are sixty-two years old or younger. If the age of appointments
were greater than sixty-two, however, our simulations suggest that two
percent of the time there would be fewer than nine Justices able to serve on
the Court.
127. These dynamics could also potentially expand the pool of potential Justices that presidents
would consider nominating. For instance, presidents may now only consider nominees that are within
five years of fifty years old, but these changes in incentives may expand the pool of potential nominees
to allow for candidates between, say, forty and sixty years old. If this occurred, it could potentially offset
the concerns raised in previous Sections.
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FIGURE 16. Estimated Number of Justices Available to Serve Conditional on
Age of Appointment for All Justices

In a related analysis, for plans that have senior Justices rejoin the Court
when there is an unexpected vacancy among the nine most junior members,
we can also assess the probability that there would be a senior Justice pulled
back on to the Court in any given year.
Figure 17 reports the results of these simulations. The estimates suggest
that if the age of nominees was fifty years old, a Justice would be pulled back
to serve on the Court after their eighteen-year term in six percent of years; if
the age of nominees was sixty years old, there would be a Justice pulled back
to serve on the Court after their eighteen-year term in forty-two percent of
years; and if the age of nominees was seventy years old, there would be a
Justice pulled back to serve on the Court after their eighteen-year term in
seventy-six percent of years.

2021]

DESIGNING SUPREME COURT TERM LIMITS

61

FIGURE 17. Percent of Years with a Justice Serving Beyond Eighteen-Year
Term Based on Age of Appointment

6. Final Period Problems
One concern with term-limits proposals is that the Justices may behave
differently closer to the end of their term because they are looking toward
future professional opportunities. In the same way that elected politicians
may behave differently once they know they are going to retire and no longer
have to face voters, Supreme Court Justices may behave differently when
they know they are about to seek new opportunities in fields like politics,
private practice, or academia.
This behavior is only likely to dramatically alter the functioning of the
Supreme Court, however, if the Justices who are changing their behavior are
marginal voters. For instance, if the Supreme Court has a 7-2
conservative/liberal split, it would be unlikely to sway many cases if either
a conservative or liberal Justice decided to vote differently because of their
upcoming professional goals. As a result, to assess this, we calculated the
share of times when a Justice’s term expires when there is a 5-4 breakdown
between Democratic-appointees and Republican-appointees (or vice versa)
on the Supreme Court under term limits. We then further calculated the share
of years where one of the Justices who is part of the five-Justice majority—
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and thus a pivotal voter—would be in the final two years of their eighteenyear term. Because these results are consistent across all five plans, we
simply report one set of results using a density distribution.
FIGURE 18. Share of Years with a 5-4 Court and a Justice in Majority in
Their Final Period

Figure 18 reports these results. The lighter (gray) distribution plots the
results from our simulations of the share of years in which a Justice exits the
Court when there is a 5-4 split on the Court. These results reveal that, on
average, exits would occur during a 5-4 split sixty-two percent of the time.
The darker (blue) distribution plots the results from our simulations of the
share of years that a Justice exits the Court when there is a 5-4 split on the
Court and the departing Justice is part of the five-member majority. These
results reveal that, on average, exits would happen by a Justice part of a fivemember majority forty-two percent of the time. (The blue curve peaks
around forty-two on the x-axis.) These results are explained by the fact that
term limits are more likely to keep the membership of the Supreme Court
balanced. As a result, there would regularly be Justices in their final period
who are pivotal voters in a Court that is split 5-4.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Our simulations produced several noteworthy findings. Several of these
simulations concern how term limits in general could improve the status quo.
We find that they do, as expected, regularize appointments across
presidential terms, decreasing variance in how many Justices each president
is able to appoint. This effect should make the Court’s membership
somewhat more reflective of election results, given that it would reduce the
role of random chance.
More significant is our finding that regularizing appointments through
term limits would tend to reduce extreme ideological balance on the Court.
This provides a strong argument in favor of term limits. Given that, ex ante,
members of neither party would know whether the randomness of the lifetenure system would benefit their party (by leading to extreme imbalance in
their party’s favor) or harm their party (by leading to extreme imbalance in
the other direction), we think this should make the stability and predictability
of term limits more attractive.
Our findings also illuminate significant differences among term-limits
plans that require more extensive discussion. In particular, they reveal what
we believe are four design choices that are important to address for any
policymaker hoping to implement an eighteen-year term-limits plan.128 First,
how a plan handles the transition from the old system to the new can have
significant consequences. Second, how the plan deals with unexpected
vacancies due to deaths or early retirements can undermine or advance some
of the goals of reform. Third, plans should include some provision for
dealing with Senate impasse, given that obstinance by the Senate could
unravel a reform designed to equalize appointments across presidencies.
Fourth, policymakers should consider whether a proposal should include
provisions meant to address the final period problem.
A. TRANSITION TIMING
Perhaps our most important takeaway is that the biggest difference
between proposals involving terms of the same length is how long they take
to become effective. The first choice the designer must face is how to handle
legacy Justices. A reform such as the UVA Plan that would go into effect
immediately would take an average of thirteen years and a maximum of
sixteen years to complete a full transition. Reforms that permit legacy
Justices to retain life tenure will take much longer. The Northwestern Plan,
128. As noted above, most reformers have converged on eighteen-year terms as the best solution,
and our analysis is focused on optimizing such plans. However, these prescriptions would likely be
applicable to term-limits proposals that involve different term lengths.
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for example, takes an average of fifty-two years to become fully effective—
and in some cases significantly longer, depending on how long the legacy
Justices live and when they leave the Court in relation to the others.
Minimizing the length of the transition would not, presumably, be the
primary concern driving the choice of whether to allow legacy Justices to
retain life tenure—since, definitionally, plans that allow legacy Justices to
retain life tenure will take longer to transition than plans that take effect
immediately. The choice might turn on legal considerations. As noted, even
if one believes that term-limits reform is constitutionally permissible via
ordinary statute, there may be additional constitutional problems raised by
stripping sitting Justices of life tenure after the fact. A plan might also permit
legacy Justices to retain life tenure in order to make the proposal more
politically viable, as the reform would thus not change the present balance
of power. For example, Republicans currently enjoy a 6-3 conservative
majority on the Court, including the Court’s three youngest Justices (Justices
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) who each could plausibly serve for
several decades. Many Republican politicians would thus likely be unwilling
to support any reform that would impose term limits on current Justices.
Other normative considerations may also play a role. Calabresi and
Lindgren argue that “[s]ince the current Justices were appointed to the Court
on the assumption that they would have life tenure, it would be unfair to
them, as well as to the appointing parties (both the president and the Senate),
to alter the arrangement struck in the appointment.”129 These concerns are
not obviously determinative. Fairness to political actors seems at best a
second- or third-order concern when discussing policy changes designed to
make a governmental institution’s membership better correspond to the
results of elections. But in any event, if policymakers choose to retain life
tenure for legacy Justices, it is important for them to understand the
implications of the choice, as it affects the composition of the Court for
decades.
But even once this choice is made, there are still meaningful differences
among plans in terms of how long they take to transition. Among plans that
permit legacy Justices to retain life tenure, there is a significant difference
between the Justices on Deck and Khanna Bill proposals on the one hand
(which take an average of 35.5 years to transition fully) and the Northwestern
Plan and Renewal Act on the other hand (which take an average of fifty-two
and forty-four years, respectively). The difference appears to be explained
by the fact that the former two plans begin the cycle of eighteen-year
appointments immediately, whereas the latter two plans have more complex
129.

Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 826.
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procedures. The Renewal Act does not begin the cycle of regular
appointments until all legacy Justices leave the Court, whereas the way the
Northwestern Plan assigns the early appointees to designated terms prolongs
the transition. Absent some other advantages of the Renewal Act or
Northwestern Plan, we think our findings demonstrate that the transition
mechanisms used by the Khanna Bill and the Justices on Deck plan are
superior and should be incorporated into any future reform that permits
legacy Justices to retain life tenure.
The UVA Plan was the only one we simulated that applied term limits
to the legacy Justices. Accordingly, we do not have any results that offer
comparative findings on such plans. But there is unlikely to be significant
variation in such plans, and all such plans will take at least sixteen years to
ensure that all Justices on the Court are serving full eighteen-year terms
(rather than temporary, shorter appointments) unless the plan abandons a
commitment to staggering the terms.
B. UNEXPECTED VACANCIES
A second takeaway is that how plans handle unexpected vacancies can
have significant consequences. For this, we consider Figure 7, which shows
the distribution of Justice-years relative to the average of thirty-six by
presidential term in the simulations. The plan with the highest variance is the
Renewal Act, which has one of the longer transition periods. But the high
variance is also explained in part by how this plan handles unexpected
vacancies: under the Renewal Act, when an unexpected vacancy occurs, the
president appoints a Justice that takes the place of an appointment that would
have been made by the next president.130 This provision can provide
significant windfalls to whoever happens to be president when a Justice
expectedly dies or retires.
One way to reduce this kind of variance is to provide for interim
appointments by the sitting president. The UVA Plan and Northwestern Plan
do this. But another path, which the Justices on Deck plan and Khanna Bill
follow, is to provide no special provision allowing additional appointments
in the case of unexpected retirements. Either option seems acceptable,
though only a plan with interim appointments is able to provide a satisfactory
solution if some black swan event—such as the death of multiple Justices
within a short period—occurs.
There are other modifications that might regularize appointments
further. One applies only to plans that do not permit legacy Justices to retain
130.

See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 7.

66

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1

life tenure; we call this procedure the “dynamic rollout.” It would provide an
improved way of addressing early deaths or retirements of legacy Justices
during the transition period that would minimize the need for interim
appointments. The best way to explain how it would work is by using a
concrete example.
Imagine that a reform were enacted in 2021. Justice Barrett, the most
junior Justice, would be scheduled to have her term expire in January 2038.
Under the UVA Plan, if she were to leave the Court unexpectedly in 2030,
the president would make a temporary appointment to serve for eight years
until a new eighteen-year appointment could be made. Under the dynamic
rollout procedure, if the president had not yet made two appointments during
that presidential term, the president would appoint a replacement Justice to
serve for a full eighteen-year term. The remaining legacy Justices would then
be “reshuffled” in order to keep the schedule on track—the second-most
junior Justice, Justice Kavanaugh, who was originally slated to leave the
Court in 2036, would leave the Court in 2038 instead. Only if a president had
already made two appointments in the current presidential term would an
interim appointment be made. The dynamic rollout procedure would not
shorten the transition. But it would minimize the role of random events by
reducing the likelihood that any one president would make more than two
appointments (including temporary appointments).
Other modifications to the plan may reduce variance among presidential
terms. One option involves permitting senior Justices to return to the Court
in the event of an unexpected departure; if there were multiple available
senior Justices, the system could give priority to the senior Justice whose
appointing president was responsible for the least Justice-years—thus
enabling the senior Justice to level the playing field somewhat through
additional years of service.
But a more creative possibility would be to permit a president, at the
time of the initial appointment, to designate additional lower-court judges as
“backups” for the Justice appointed to the Court.131 That would mean that,
in the event of the appointed Justice’s early departure from the Court, one of
the backups could fill the departing Justice’s seat for the remainder of the
term. Perhaps these backups would be formally nominated and confirmed at
the time of the initial appointment, which might best preserve the Senate’s
role in the process.132 Assuming the president were permitted to designate a
131. This procedure would almost certainly only work if reform were accomplished through a
constitutional amendment rather than a statute.
132. Cf. Nina A. Mendelson, The Permissibility of Acting Officials: May the President Work Around
Senate Confirmation?, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 606 & n.369 (2020) (discussing the possibility of a
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sufficient number of backups, this system would guarantee equal impact on
the Court among presidents and would greatly reduce the role of random
events in shaping the composition of the Court.133
C. SENATE IMPASSE
Another takeaway is that term-limits plans should address the
possibility that a Senate controlled by members of the party that does not
control the presidency will refuse to vote on a president’s nominee, thus
potentially derailing the goal of equalizing appointments across presidential
terms. This possibility seems particularly likely in the wake of the
Republican-controlled Senate’s refusal to hold hearings or a vote for
President Obama’s nominee, Judge Garland, in 2016. We could hope that a
successfully implemented term-limits plan might cause a “reset” of norms
governing the appointments process, though that is certainly not guaranteed,
and in any event, norms once restored could nonetheless break down once
more in the future. It thus seems prudent to include a provision handling this
possibility.
Our findings show that this situation could arise with some regularity.
For the Renewal Act, the proposal where this scenario arose most frequently,
seventy-five percent of vacancies on the Court arose during periods when
the Senate and presidency were controlled by different parties. Even under
the Khanna Bill and Justices on Deck Plan, at the other end of the spectrum,
sixty-two percent of vacancies arose during divided government. If refusal
to act on the other party’s nominees becomes the norm, these scenarios could
quickly derail any meaningful reform.
One possibility would be to provide that presidents get both
appointments in the first year of their term, a period when divided
government is less likely. But even so, our simulations found that many firstyear appointments still arose during divided government. For this reason, we
think a more targeted solution is warranted, such as a set of provisions that
would reduce the Senate’s incentives to refuse to approve any of the
president’s nominees. One possibility, discussed briefly above, is Calabresi’s
suggestion that the president and Senate be forced to reach agreement before
“shadow cabinet” confirmed by the Senate that could step in to fill acting roles in the event of an executive
branch vacancy).
133. Random events that required backups to be called into active service would still play some role
in shaping the Court’s jurisprudence, as one president’s nominees do not vote in lockstep. President
Clinton’s nominees, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, did not always agree, nor did President Bush’s
nominees, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Nonetheless, a system that limited the role of random
events to causing the swap of one president’s nominee with a different nominee by the same president
would almost certainly give less of a role to random chance in producing a significant ideological shift
than would a system that permits unexpected departures.
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they could perform any other government business and while holding their
salaries hostage.134
But we can imagine other less aggressive possibilities. One option
would be, in the event of the Senate’s refusal to confirm a nominee within
some period of time, to automatically appoint one of a number of backups
previously designated if the president in question had made earlier
appointments during her presidency. That is, a president could designate
backup appointments when making an appointment in Year 1 of her
presidency so that, if party control of the Senate changes hands later, an
obstructive Senate in Year 3 of the president’s term would lead to the
automatic appointment of a backup. Such a provision would deprive the
Senate of the ability to hold out indefinitely to keep a seat open for the next
president.
This option would not work, however, if the deadlock arose during the
president’s first appointment to the Court, and thus some other mechanism
is needed to address the problem of deadlock entirely. Perhaps there could
be a penalty for the party in control of the Senate. One possibility would be
to penalize the Senate majority’s party by depriving the next president from
that party of nominations to which she would normally be entitled. Such a
provision would thus deprive a further president of the very advantage which
the Senate was attempting to seize.135
These solutions are only a couple of possibilities; no doubt there are
others.136 But, in any event, some method for handling Senate impasse is
necessary if term-limits reform is to accomplish its goals.
D. THE FINAL PERIOD PROBLEM
One prominent criticism of term-limits reforms is that they could
“introduce incentives for Supreme Court Justices to cast votes in a way that
improves their prospects for future employment outside the judiciary.”137 In
particular, critics of term limits worry that term-limited Justices might be
134. See Calabresi, supra note 48.
135. A more outlandish solution would be to impose a penalty on the terms of currently serving
Justices. If, for example, the Senate failed to act on a president’s nominee, Justices currently on the Court
who had been appointed by presidents of the party currently controlling the Senate could have their terms
reduced by a set amount (such as 18 years collectively). This procedure is not ideal, however, as it would
reduce the influence of a prior president who was not responsible for the deadlock.
136. For those who believe the Senate should have the categorical right to reject any nominees as
part of its “advise and consent” role, a less significant reform would be one that simply required the
Senate to actually vote on a nominee to make their inaction more visible and thus force political
accountability. Such a reform, however, would likely be insufficient to prevent a term limits plan from
unraveling.
137. Stras & Scott, supra note 19, at 1425.
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drawn to “the remunerative lure of affiliation with firms” or “the chance to
pursue interesting positions in public service: cabinet posts,
ambassadorships, and so on.”138 Indeed, there is evidence that such
incentives distort the behavior of elected officials and their staffers in the
period immediately before they pursue other employment.139
For those concerned about this possibility, our results provide reason to
think it could be a problem. We would expect this phenomenon to be most
pronounced, if it exists, at the end of a Justice’s term, immediately before
the Justice might seek further employment. Our results suggest that in fortytwo percent of years, there would be Justices in the majority of a court
divided 5-4 along party lines who were also in their final year on the bench.
If Justices’ concerns about future employment change Justices’ votes in
cases that normally track ideological divisions on the Court, these results
suggest that those voting changes could affect the actual outcomes in those
cases with some frequency.
Our results do not, however, speak to how likely it is that concerns
about future employment would actually influence Justices’ voting patterns.
There are some grounds for skepticism. Oliver argues that “[g]iven the age
of most Justices when they enter the Court, and the fact that [term limits]
might be expected to cause Presidents to name even older Justices, it is
unlikely that many Justices will have future professional or political
ambitions after completing eighteen years on the Court.”140 Some Justices
would likely be content to spend the remainder of their careers sitting as
judges on the lower federal courts, as Justice Souter has since he retired from
the Supreme Court at age sixty-nine.141
Moreover, it is not at all clear that Justices would feel any need to
change their votes even if they were interested in going on to lucrative
private employment. Given that there are very few Justices and many
potential employers among large law firms, law schools, major corporations,
and so forth that would presumably be interested in hiring a former Justice,
a term-limited Justice would almost certainly have no shortage of highpaying employment opportunities regardless of how she voted. There may,
however, be a slightly more realistic concern about retiring Justices
interested in serving in government in some capacity, as those opportunities
“would depend on the Justice’s ability to stay well-liked by the party in
138. Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 447.
139. See Shepherd & You, supra note 93; SANTOS, supra note 93.
140. Oliver, supra note 7, at 818 (footnotes omitted).
141. See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Retired Justices, SCOTUSBLOG (May 26,
2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/scotus-for-law-students-retired-justices [https://perma.cc/
2NX8-ZHHR].
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power.”142
In any event, a term-limits reform could include provisions designed to
mitigate this concern. Vicki Jackson suggests “minimum age requirements
for service or post employment prohibitions” as potential solutions.143 Age
minimums would reduce the risk that Justices left office with many working
years ahead of them, but they would also increase the risk that Justices die
or have to retire before the end of their term. A statute barring certain kinds
of future employment—such as law firms who have business before the
Court or companies who have been parties before the Court, as well as highlevel government positions—would seem to solve the problem.144
Will Baude also raises a separate, but related objection—that “the
sitting Justices will lose some of their current incentives to invest in their
own judicial reputation as judges.”145 Neither a minimum-age requirement
nor a bar on post-judicial employment is responsive to this concern. Yet, it
is hard to see why this prediction is likely. For any given Justice, her service
on the Court will almost certainly be the high point of her career and the role
for which she will be remembered by history. However much a desire to
maintain one’s reputation shapes a Justice’s behavior, we do not see how
term limits would make the problem worse. If anything, they might increase
the disciplining effect of reputational concerns because any individual
instance of behavior that harms the Justice’s reputation might be seen as
more damaging in comparison to the Justice’s shorter tenure on the bench.
In summary, although we are uncertain about the degree to which
incentive distortion related to future employment would occur, any termlimits reforms should probably include a post-judicial employment
prohibition to avoid the problem. To the extent that such a bar would be seen
as unfair or overly restrictive, Justices could be persuaded not to take further
employment through a pension system that rewarded them for remaining on
the bench as senior Justices.146
We also note that almost every U.S. state147 and many other countries148
142. Farnsworth, supra note 45, at 447.
143. Jackson, supra note 17, at 1002 n.156.
144. For a proposal for such a bar on employment for all federal judges, see generally Mary L.
Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 841 (2011). Clark proposes
barring judges “from returning to practice, including work as lawyers or lawyer-consultants in the public
or private sectors, but not as neutral arbitrators or mediators.” Id. at 895.
145. Baude, supra note 48.
146. Cf. Stras & Scott, supra note 19 (arguing for financial incentives to encourage judges with life
tenure to retire).
147. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 3, at 821 (“Of the fifty U.S. states, only one—Rhode
Island—provides for a system of life tenure for its Supreme Court justices.”).
148. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM.
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have courts of last resort that use term limits or age limits for Justices. To
the extent that the final period problem is real and significant, we could
expect to see it emerge in these other judicial systems. Yet, there is little if
any evidence from these judicial systems supporting the claim that term
limits negatively affect judicial behavior.149
CONCLUSION
If policymakers do decide to implement term limits, our research offers
concrete guidance on how to design such a regime. Of course, there are a
number of other considerations relevant to choosing between possible termlimits proposals that we did not consider here. For instance, one important
question is whether some of the design choices outlined above may make a
given plan more politically viable and thus more likely to be enacted.150
Given this complexity and given that we lack any comparative expertise in
political viability, we tend to agree with Adrian Vermeule’s suggestion that
academic discussions of reform should “deliberately ignore political
feasibility,” leaving it to politics itself to determine which proposals, if any,
are viable.151
Another important consideration involves the question of legal
constraints on Supreme Court reform. Is a statutory term-limits proposal
constitutionally permissible if properly constructed or would it inevitably run
afoul of Article III’s guarantee of tenure during good behavior? And even if
statutory term-limits reform of some kind is possible, do other specific
design choices—such as whether to impose term limits on legacy Justices—
raise additional constitutional problems? Although these are questions on
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 23 (2001) (noting, in a study of twenty-seven countries’ judicial systems, that
“the United States, lacking either a mandatory retirement age or limited terms for members of its highest
constitutional court, is something of an anomaly”).
149. One study of the Italian Constitutional Court, on which judges serve for nine-year terms,
concluded that “careerism” among such judges causes them to invest more time and effort on cases that
are likely to improve the judges’ reputations among relevant political and legal audiences. See Alessandro
Melcarne, Careerism and Judicial Behavior, 44 EUR J. L. & ECON. 241 (2017). This study did not,
however, demonstrate how much term limits actually contributed to this problem (given that judges may
have incentives to maximize reputation even in a system of life tenure) and did not seek to determine
whether this effect is more pronounced at the end of a judge’s term.
150. For example, proposals that push off changes further into the future (such as by not imposing
term limits on legacy Justices) might be either more politically viable because they do not look like power
grabs or less politically viable because they produce immediate benefits such that they are more likely to
find political champions. Yet, which path is most likely seems difficult to know. Indeed, as Adrian
Vermeule has noted, this “trade-off between impartiality and motivation” may make Supreme Court term
limits systematically unlikely to occur: a proposal that takes effect later “makes reform possible by
creating an appearance of impartiality and buying off current opposition, but the tactic also makes the
reform less likely to be proposed and pursued” precisely because there are no short-term gains from
enacting it. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154,
1169 (2006).
151. Id. at 1172.
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which legal scholars have offered their expertise,152 they are beyond the
scope of our inquiry. The constitutional issues appear sufficiently nuanced
and complex that we could not give them adequate consideration while also
engaging in the comparative inquiry that is our main goal here.
Finally, there are a number of specific goals that term-limits reformers
could have that we have not built into our framework. Some reformers may
choose a reform with the goal of depoliticizing the appointments process or
increasing the Court’s legitimacy. Other reformers might pursue term limits
with the aim of shaping the law in one direction or another. While such
considerations may be important motivators for reformers, they too are
beyond the scope of our analysis. How term limits might change the law, for
example, is a question that would turn on many contingent facts about the
specific area of the law in question, the precise time when reform was
enacted, and predictions about the results of future elections. Such questions
do not strike us as likely subjects of empirical comparisons among proposals,
and we thus did not consider them.
But even though we do not address all these subjects, if either party
were to push for term limits for the Supreme Court Justices, our research
gives important guidance into how to design such a plan. We not only
provide a framework that guides analysis of any potential proposal, but also
show how the choices that are made lead to substantial differences across a
range of key outcomes. In short, our research reveals that term limits in
general and the details of any term-limits reform in particular would both
have profound implications for the functioning of the Court.
152. See, e.g., Prakash & Smith, supra note 18; Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, Reply:
(Mis)Understanding Good-Behavior Tenure, 116 YALE L.J. 159 (2006); Redish, supra note 18; Cramton,
supra note 63.

